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DESIGNING LAW SCHOOL EXTERNSHIPS
THAT COMPLY WITH THE FLSA
NIKI KUCKES*
Recent debates over the best way to educate lawyers have led to
an increasing focus on providing "experiential" education in law
schools - and with it, a noted growth in law school externship pro-
grams. Externships provide a valuable way of giving law students
real-life legal practice experience by allowing them to earn academic
credit for training in a variety of actual legal settings, from prosecu-
tors' offices to corporate counsel departments. Because current ABA
Standards for the Accreditation of Law Schools do not permit stu-
dents to be paid for activities for which they earn academic credit, law
school externships are unpaid, raising questions under the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA), which bars covered employers from offering
unpaid positions unless those positions qualify for one of the specific
exceptions recognized by the Department of Labor. This Article
demonstrates that the interests of the law schools and the Department
of Labor are aligned in this area, both seeking to ensure that unpaid
externships genuinely provide meaningful education and training for
the law student externs who participate. The Article derives a set of
"best practices" for designing FLSA-compliant law school externship
programs, highlights some pitfalls that may arise, and suggests spe-
cific steps to be taken both by law school externship program direc-
tors and host organizations who may participate in legal externship
programs.
INTRODUCTION
Externship programs have become increasingly popular in law
schools across the United States. Such programs put law students in
field placements from public defenders' offices, to public interest
groups, to private law firms, in order to provide them with experien-
tial training in the real world as part of the law school's educational
program.' A classroom or tutorial component is also included, and
the placement is monitored by the law school to ensure that the extern
is being trained and getting appropriate assignments. Importantly,
* Professor of Law, Roger Williams University School of Law. This Article was pre-
pared with assistance from Professor Cecily Banks, Professor of Legal Writing at RWU
and the director of our Corporate Counsel Externship program.
1 In particular, this Article considers law school externships that meet the following
criteria: (1) the students are not paid; (2) the students earn academic credit; and (3) the
externship takes place at a work site not operated by the law school itself.
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these are not term-time jobs for law students. 2 Student externs earn
academic credit toward their law degree, but are not paid; indeed, stu-
dents cannot be paid under current American Bar Association (ABA)
standards governing legal education. 3 Legal externships are more
akin to the type of field training that has typically been provided in
other professional fields, such as medicine, for many years.
As the range of law school externship opportunities has expanded
- and student demand has arisen for experiences in a wide range of
legal settings, including not only public agencies and non-profit
groups, but also private companies and firms -schools are increasingly
struggling with the issue of whether the Fair Labor Standards Act (the
Act or the FLSA) applies to unpaid externships.4 The FLSA is a
broad national statute that protects workers by requiring that covered
employers pay at least minimum wage and observe other require-
ments, such as overtime rules, with respect to its employees. 5 A cov-
ered entity that fails to properly treat its employees may be subject to
private lawsuits, including both individual actions and specially au-
thorized class actions,6 as well as to enforcement actions brought by
the Department of Labor to enforce the FLSA.7
Given the increasing interest in the role of externships in legal
education, there is a pressing need to understand and address the legal
status of law school externships under the FLSA. While compliance
with the FLSA is the direct responsibility of the host organizations,
law schools are also concerned to design their externship programs to
be proper, appropriate and respectful of legal requirements. This Ar-
ticle analyzes the statute, case law, and administrative statements by
2 Note that paid internships and/or paid law clerk positions accepted by law students
do not implicate the same concerns addressed in this Article. Such employment should be
permissible as long as the employer pays the law student at least minimum wage and com-
plies with other FLSA and legal requirements applicable to employees.
3 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, REVISED STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL OF LAW
SCHOOLS (Aug. 2014) [hereinafter ABA Standards], Interpretation 305-2 ("A law school
may not grant credit to a student for participation in a field placement program for which
the student receives compensation."). While the ABA recently considered whether the
standards should be amended to allow law students to earn academic credit for paid field
placements, in August of 2014, the ABA House of Delegates decided to remand the issue
for further consideration, without changing the existing approach. See American Bar As-
sociation, "Revised Standards and Rules Concurred in by ABA House of Delegates,"
available at: http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal-education
and admissions tothebar/council-reportsand resolutions/2014_hod standards concur-
rence-announcement.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited August 31, 2014).
4 Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq.
5 FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 206(b) (minimum wage); § 207(a) (overtime).
6 FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (authorizing collective actions to be brought by an ag-
grieved employee on behalf of himself and other employees who are "similarly situated").
7 FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(c) (authorizing civil enforcement actions by the Secretary of
Labor).
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the Department of Labor in this area, in order to assess the proper
design of an FLSA-compliant legal externship program. The question
this Article considers, in particular, is whether a law student externing
for academic credit (but without pay) at a company, firm, or organiza-
tion as part of a formal law school externship program will be treated
as an "employee" of that entity for FLSA purposes. If an extern is an
"employee," as the Labor Department defines that term, a host or-
ganization that accepts unpaid law student externs may be placing it-
self at risk of legal exposure.
This Article concludes that law school externship programs - in-
cluding those that place student externs in the for-profit sector - can
pass muster under the FLSA, even if externs are not paid, if the pro-
grams are carefully designed and properly administered to meet the
requirements of a bona fide training program. The requirements for
such programs are outlined in a six-part test, grounded in a 1947 Su-
preme Court decision,8 which has long been followed by the Depart-
ment of Labor in administrative interpretations under the FLSA.
While more specific details are discussed below, the fundamental
touchstone of a permissible externship program is an educational ex-
perience in the workplace that is designed and supervised so that ex-
terns will "receive training for their own educational benefit." 9 By
contrast, a work program that simply uses unpaid externs to substitute
for regular employees will not be excluded from FLSA requirements.
The law student externs must be "trainees," not ordinary workers.
The goals of law schools and the Department of Labor are in
sync. Law schools are concerned to ensure that externships be genuine
learning opportunities for our students. Law schools also care about
ensuring that the high quality standards enforced within the law
school extend to all of the school's educational programs, including
those that take place off-site with the law school's host organizations.
A meaningful externship experience is also expressly required in or-
der for a law school to comply with ABA standards for law schools.10
The Department of Labor's goals with respect to the training pro-
gram exclusion are similar. In defining the parameters of legitimate
on-the-job training programs for which workers need not be paid, the
Department of Labor is seeking to ensure that the training that takes
place on employer premises is a genuine educational experience, and
8 See generally Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148 (1947); U.S. DEPART-
MENT OF LABOR, FAcr SHEET #71. INTERNSHIP PROGRAMS UNDER THE FAIR LABOR
STANDARDS Acr (April 2010), available at http://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/whdfs
71.pdf [hereinafter Fact Sheet #71].
9 Id. at 1 (laying out six-part test for "trainee" exception to FLSA).
10 See ABA Standards, supra note 3, Standard 303(a)(3) (Curriculum) and Standard
305 (Field Placements and Other Study Outside the Classroom).
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not a veiled attempt to exploit free student labor. Because the pri-
mary purpose of the FLSA is to make sure that workers are not ex-
ploited, either by underpaying or overworking them, the Department
views the exclusion for training programs as a narrow exception to the
general rule that workers should be paid for their efforts.
Not surprisingly, therefore, many of the requirements that the
ABA imposes on law student externships - such as close supervision
and opportunities for reflection - are echoed in the Department of
Labor factors used to determine whether an educational externship
will qualify for FLSA exclusion. This means, in the law school con-
text, an externship program that is carefully designed to meet ABA
standards is likely to satisfy many of the Labor Department concerns
as well. Where additional program factors may be advisable to com-
ply with the FLSA, the Article notes that below.
Concerns about potential FLSA issues are most often raised in
connection with law student externs who provide their services at for-
profit sites, such as in-house corporate offices or private law firms.
But because the FLSA expressly applies to government offices," and
because the minimum wage and overtime requirements of the law
may potentially apply to both private and non-profit firms and compa-
nies,12 this Article suggests that the best practice is to ensure that all
law school externships meet the conditions of a valid training pro-
gram, whatever the setting. At the same time, the FLSA analysis is
somewhat different with respect to externing at for-profit entities than
at non-profit organizations or government agencies.
This Article is divided into five parts. Part I notes the general
types of legal externship programs being offered and puts such extern-
ship offerings in the context of current discussions in the ABA about
experiential courses in legal education more generally. Part II lays out
the basic FLSA framework applicable to employment relationships,
and considers the relevant exclusions under which unpaid externships
may be a permissible exception to the Act's wage and hours require-
ments. Part III addresses the FLSA as applied in the context of law
school externs placed in for-profit placements, including companies
and law firms. Part IV addresses the FLSA as applied in the context of
law school externs in the non-profit sector, including charitable orga-
nizations and government agencies. Finally, Part V provides some
"best practices" in designing FLSA-compliant law school externship
11 FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 29(d) and (e) (FLSA applies to "public agencies" including fed-
eral, state and local governmental bodies).
12 See Tony and Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec'y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 296-97 (1985)
(noting that the statute "contains no express or implied exception for commercial activities
conducted by religious or other nonprofit organizations").
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programs.
I. LAw SCHOOL EXTERNSHIPS AND NATIONAL DEBATES ABOUT
EXPERIENTIAL EDUCATION
Consistent with national trends toward increasing "experiential"
offerings in legal education, in recent years, law schools have been
strengthening and expanding their externship program offerings. A
number of law schools have extensive and growing externship pro-
grams, as has been well documented by other authors.' 3 Significantly,
the ABA just amended the ABA Standards for Law Schools to re-
quire each student at every ABA-accredited law school to take six
credits of "experiential courses" as part of the J.D. degree program.14
Because this experiential educational requirement can be satisfied by
student participation in externships, as well as in clinics and simulation
courses, the change is likely to further fuel the growth in law school
externship programs.' 5
In a well-designed externship program, the law school carefully
selects the organizations to which it is willing to send student externs.
During each externship, law schools work to ensure that the extern's
work is meaningful legal work of a type that will broaden the student's
skill set; that the extern is guided and supervised by experienced law-
yers on-site; that the host organization shares the law school's goal to
make the externship a valuable learning experience for the extern;
that the students are provided with a law school supervisor; and that
there is an accompanying academic component to encourage the stu-
dent externs to recognize and internalize the lessons they are learning
through the real-life legal experience.
Law schools offer a variety of externship opportunities, which can
be grouped into several basic categories:
1) Judicial externships, which place students in externship posi-
tions in federal, state, or other specialized judges' chambers.
2) Governmental externships, which place students in externship
positions in government offices, such as prosecutors or public
13 See, e.g., Sudeb Basu & J.P. Ogilvy, Externship Demographics Across Two Decades
With Lessons for Future Surveys, 19 CLIN. L. REV. 1, 5 (2012) (reporting on two decades of
data concerning law school externship programs and finding that as of 2012, "[a]ll 190
schools surveyed now offer externships with academic credit that a student can earn to-
ward the J.D. degree" and that the variety of externship courses offered at law schools has
also progressed). See also James H. Backman & Cory S. Clements, Significant but Unher-
alded Growth of Large Externship Programs, 28 BYU J. Pus. L. 145, 186 (2013) (noting
the "steep increases in both in-house clinic students and externship students over the past
eight years).
14 See ABA Standards, supra note 3, Standard 303(a)(3).
15 Id. ("An experiential course must be a simulation course, a law clinic, or a field
placement.").
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defender offices and government agencies;
3) Public interest externships, which place students in externships
in non-profit organizations, such as legal aid offices and special
issue non-profit groups.
4) Corporate counsel externships, which place students in extem-
ships in the office of the general counsel to a corporation;
5) Law firm externships, which place students in externships in
private for-profit law firms, whether to work on many types of
cases, on pro bono matters only, or on a specific type of legal
work.
In addition to the externship programs above, many law schools are
now offering Semester in Practice programs, which allow qualifying
students to be placed full-time in externship placements for an entire
law school semester, earning credit toward their J.D. degree.
Another related, but distinct, type of placement offered by law
schools is designed to require or allow students to engage in pro bono
service in collaboration with lawyers in the field. 16 Students do not
receive academic credit or pay for such projects, but for schools that
have a pro bono graduation requirement, students are allowed to
count the time spent toward satisfaction of that requirement. Extern-
ship and pro bono programs are generally well-subscribed and can be
important to the law school's mission to provide a complete and effec-
tive education for its students.
The growing student interest in externships reflects a similar na-
tional trend toward experiential education at law schools more
broadly. In recent years, the American Bar Association has been
looking closely at improvements that may be needed in the American
system of legal education. Most recently, in 2012, the ABA formed a
Task Force on the Future of Legal Education. One of the Task Force's
express conclusions was that there is a pressing need in legal educa-
tion for "more attention to skills training, experiential learning, and
the development of practice-related competencies."17
The ABA has responded to this call by substantially strengthen-
ing its professional skills requirement. Prior to August of 2104, the
ABA Standard in place simply provided that law schools must "re-
quire that each student receive substantial instruction in" a variety of
areas, including substantive law, legal analysis, research and problem-
solving, legal writing, and "other professional skills generally regarded
as necessary for the effective and responsible participation in the legal
16 This was the focus of a recent ABA inquiry to the Labor Department, discussed infra
at Part III.A.1.
17 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, TASK FORCE ON THE FUTURE OF LEGAL EDUCATION
3 (2014).
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profession."18 As a result of recent changes, law schools will need to
require each student to complete "one or more experiential course(s)
totaling at least six credit hours." The experiential courses can include
simulation courses, clinical courses, or field placements that are "pri-
marily experiential in nature" and satisfy certain other requirements. 19
The drive to give law students more hands-on experience, prior to
graduation, in a variety of legal settings is likely to continue and grow.
One key part of this movement is the use of field placements - that is,
law student externships taken for credit - in settings in which students
are likely to practice law. Because most graduating law students end
up practicing in the for-profit sector, rather than in government agen-
cies or non-profit organizations, there is and will continue to be a de-
mand for hands-on experience during law school in such settings. The
potential FLSA issues raised by this trend are addressed further
below.
II. THE FLSA, EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIPS AND LAW SCHOOL
EXTERNSHIP PROGRAMS
The Fair Labor Standards Act is the primary federal law that gov-
erns the relationship between employers and employees. Among
other things, the Act requires that employers pay covered employees
a legally prescribed minimum hourly wage,20 and that employers pro-
vide overtime pay for hours worked over a specified threshold each
week.21 The Act is a statute of broad coverage enacted to prevent the
exploitation of workers by employers. The Act's requirement that
employers pay their workers a minimum hourly wage is justified on a
number of rationales: to protect the worker on site from being ex-
ploited by an employer; to prevent the prevailing wage for other
workers from falling to substandard levels; and to prevent employers
from getting an unfair advantage over their competitors. Given the
statute's remedial nature, the courts have emphasized that the FLSA
is to be given "an expansive interpretation" so that its provisions have
the "widest possible impact in the national economy." 22 It is likely
that all or virtually all of the positions in which law student externs are
18 See ABA Standards, supra note 3, Standard 302(a)(4).
19 See ABA Standards, supra note 3, Standard 303(a)(3).
20 FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 206 (Minimum Wage). Minimum wage is currently set, at the
federal level, at $7.25 an hour. FLSA, § 206(a)(1). However, because state employment
laws may supplement federal laws, if state law provides for a higher minimum wage, this
will apply in lieu of the federal minimum wage to employers subject to that state's laws. In
Rhode Island, for example, the minimum wage is set at $8.00, which is above the federal
threshold.
21 FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 207 (Maximum Hours).
22 Herman v. RSR Sec. Servs. Ltd., 172 F.3d 132, 139 (2d Cir. 1999).
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likely to serve are subject to the coverage of the FLSA. While this is a
federal statute enacted under the Commerce Clause, and thus is theo-
retically not applicable to purely local employers, in fact, the Act ap-
plies quite broadly.
A. The Broad Reach Of The Fair Labor Standards Act
The FLSA applies to all employees of covered "enterprises." 2 3
The principal statutory definition of a covered "enterprise" is an en-
tity that engages in interstate commerce, is organized for a "common
business purpose," and takes in at least $500,000 in gross income each
year. Most of the companies participating in law school corporate
counsel programs would fall in this category as would many law firms.
But the FLSA also goes beyond this. The FLSA also expressly applies,
under entity coverage, to employees of "public agencies," a provision
that includes most employees at federal, state and local government
agencies. 24 Thus, externship work sites such as prosecutors or defend-
ers offices, offices of the Attorney General, and other governmental
agencies would also be subject to the FLSA.
The Supreme Court has held, as well, that that there is no statu-
tory exclusion from enterprise coverage for non-profit organizations,
despite the Act's reference to a "common business purpose." Non-
profit organizations are subject to the FLSA as covered "enterprises"
when they engage in activities that are commonly undertaken by for-
profit entities. It is possible that non-profit organizations participating
in law school externship programs may at times be subject to FLSA
coverage on this ground. For example, a non-profit legal defense
group that engages in litigation activities of the type also performed
by for-profit law firms may potentially be viewed as competing against
such private firms in the marketplace for clients, particularly where
the cases they take are eligible for fee-shifting.
In any case, quite aside from "enterprise" coverage, the FLSA
also covers workers on an alternative basis: so-called "individual" cov-
erage. Even if an entity is not covered, an individual at a work site
who uses means of interstate commerce in her position - for example,
to send mail or e-mail, converse by phone, and so on - will be subject
to the FLSA on an individual basis.25 Under these precedents, even if
enterprise coverage is not applicable, given that law students will pre-
23 FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203(r)(1).
24 FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(2).
25 See, e.g., Archie v. Grand Central Partnership, Inc., 997 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)
(finding that "local business activities fall within the reach of the FLSA" when workers
handle goods or materials that have moved in interstate commerce, such as where sanita-
tion workers use "bags, brooms, shovel, pails, scrapers" and similar supplies).
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sumably be using the internet, researching online, making phone calls,
sending e-mails, and otherwise using instrumentalities of commerce, it
is virtually certain that their externships would qualify them on an
"individual" basis for FLSA coverage, regardless of the type of organ-
ization where they have been placed.26
Given the broad reach of the FLSA, it should be assumed that all
or most of the externship placements at a law school will be subject to
the FLSA on one ground or another. The key issue, therefore, is not
whether the FLSA applies, but how the Department of Labor would
likely view a particular extern's status under that law. The question
here is two-fold: Given the nature of the extern's responsibilities and
the employer's role, does the law student extern fall within the broad
definition of an "employee" who is entitled to minimum wage and
hours protections under the FLSA? Or will the law student extern
qualify for one of the narrow exclusions or exemptions from FLSA
coverage under which a person may provide services to a covered em-
ployer without being deemed an "employee" covered by the law?
B. Employees, Exclusions, and Exemptions Under The FLSA
The Fair Labor Standards Act defines "employ" as "to suffer or
permit to work." 27 An "employee" is defined as "any individual em-
ployed by an employer." 28 An "employer" is defined as "any person
acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation
to an employee." 29 Courts have noted both the "striking breadth" and
the circularity of this definition.30 Again, the coverage of the Act is
broadly construed. 31 The Act was consciously drafted to be ambigu-
ous so that the courts would not be confined to pre-existing law defin-
ing employment relationships. 32
26 See generally U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, FACT SHEET #3: PROFESSIONAL OF-
FICES UNDER THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS Acr (July 2008) (noting that individual em-
ployees are engaged in interstate commerce when they perform actions such as
"transacting business via interstate telephone calls or the U.S. Mail" or undertaking a vari-
ety of other actions with an interstate component).
27 FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203(g).
28 FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1).
29 FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203(d).
30 See, e.g., Solis v. Laurelbrook Sanitarium and School, 642 F.2d 518, 522 (6th Cir.
2011) (noting that the FLSA's definitions in this area are "exceedingly broad and generally
unhelpful"); Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc., 2013 WL 2495140 (S.D.N.Y. June 11,
2013) (noting the "striking breadth" of the FLSA's definition of "employ"); O'Neill v. East
Florida Eye Institute, 2012 WL 8969062 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 17, 2012) (noting that the FLSA
definition of "employee" is "somewhat circular").
31 See, e.g., Donovan v. American Airlines, Inc., 686 F.2d 267, 271 (5th Cir. 1982) (not-
ing that the term "employee" in the FLSA is used in the broadest sense ever included in
one act).
32 See, e.g., Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 729 (1947) (noting that
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In determining the employment relationship under the FLSA, the
courts will consider the "totality of the circumstances." Courts are not
bound by the particular labels a party may attach to its relationship
with a worker.33 They will look instead to the "economic reality" of
the relationship. 34 The economic reality may at times indicate, for ex-
ample, that someone who has been described as an "intern" or a
"trainee" is in fact an employee, given the facts of the work
circumstances.35
While the coverage of the Act is intentionally broad, it does not
cover all relationships between an employer and a person who pro-
vides services to that employer. There are some exceptions and exclu-
sions under which a person will not be deemed an "employee," even if
he or she does the type of work that could create an employment rela-
tionship in other circumstances.
Some of the situations in which a person is not deemed an "em-
ployee" are described in the statute itself and are known as exemp-
tions. Others have been created by judicial or administration
interpretation, and these are known as exceptions. There are three
such doctrines that are worth noting here: (1) the statutory exemption
for professional employees, under which lawyers are exempted from
the FLSA; (2) the statutory exemption for volunteers at public agen-
cies (which the Department has extended by interpretation to cover
volunteers at non-profit groups); and (3) the judicially-created excep-
tion from coverage under FLSA for "trainees". Each is addressed in
turn below. 36
the FLSA's definitions of "employ" and "employee" are "comprehensive enough to re-
quire its application to many persons and working relationships, which prior to this Act,
were not deemed to fall within an employer-employee category").
33 See, e.g., Marshall v. Baptist Hospital, Inc., 473 F. Supp. 465 (M.D. Tenn. 1979). In
that case, the court went through a list of prior decisions that rejected the parties' own
label as to the nature of their relationship, and instead considered the facts "in specific
detail" to decide whether the FLSA applied. Id. at 468.
34 See, e.g., Tony & Susan Alamo Foundation v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 301
(1985).
35 See, e.g., Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc., 2013 WL 2495140 (S.D.N.Y. June 11,
2013) (finding interns at film production studios to be employees where the routine work
they did allowed the employer to reduce its payroll costs); Marshall v. Baptist Hospital,
Inc., 473 F. Supp. 465 (M.D. Tenn. 1979) (finding that radiology trainees to be employees
where the hospital failed to observe the requirements of the training program).
36 There is also a distinction, under the Department of Labor's interpretations, between
employees and independent contractors. An independent contractor is, in essence, a per-
son who is "engaged in a business or his or her own" and who sells services to another as
part of that business. See generally U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, FAcT SHEET #13: AM I
AN EMPLOYEE?: EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP UNDER THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS Acr
(FLSA) (May 2014). This exception is not addressed further in this memo, given that law
students are clearly not independent business-owners who are providing services to host
organizations.
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1. The Exemption For "Professionals"
There is a statutory exemption from FLSA coverage for employ-
ees in a professional capacity.37 The Labor Department has issued
regulations to further define those professional employees that are ex-
empt from the wage and overtime requirements of the law. To qualify
as a "professional" employee, a person must, among other things,
"perform work requiring advanced knowledge," defined to mean
work which is "predominantly intellectual in character" and which re-
quires the "consistent exercise of judgment and discretion."38
By virtue of this exemption, practicing lawyers are excluded from
FLSA coverage as "learned professionals," as a matter of Department
of Labor interpretation.39 On the other hand, the Department has
explained that this exemption does not extend to paralegals or legal
assistants, who are not required to have the advanced training needed
to practice law, and are usually considered to be covered employees.40
A law student, unlike a paralegal, intends to become a lawyer and is in
the process of pursuing advanced academic studies to that end. At the
same time, he or she has neither completed a program of law studies
nor obtained a law license, and is not actually practicing law.
It is instructive, in this regard, to look at the Department's ap-
proach to interns in the medical school context. The Department has
explained that physicians are "professionals" who are exempt from
the FLSA wage and overtime requirements. Medical interns, simi-
larly, will not be found subject to salary requirements during their in-
ternship or resident program "where such a training program is
entered upon after the earning of the appropriate degree required for
the general practice of their profession." 41 The Department's empha-
sis on the employee's actual possession of an advanced degree sug-
gests that law students (or medical students) would not receive similar
37 See FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1) (exempting from FLSA coverage those employees
who are "employed in a bona fide executive, administrative or professional capacity"). See
generally U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, FAcr SHEET #17A: EXEMPTION FOR EXEcuTIVE,
ADMINISTRATIVE, PROFESSIONAL, COMPUTER & OUTSIDE SALES EMPLOYEES UNDER THE
FAIR LABOR STANDARDS Acr (FLSA) (July 2008) (explaining the statutory exemption for
administrative, professional, executive, computer, and outside sales representatives); 29
C.F.R. Part 541 (same).
38 29 C.F.R. § 541.301(a).
39 See 29 C.F.R. § 541.304(a)(1) (applying professional exemption to "any employee
who is the holder of a valid license or certificate permitting the practice of law .. . and is
actually engaged in the practice thereof").
40 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, FIELD OPERATIONS HANDBOOK, § 221i(a) ("Parale-
gals and legal assistants generally do not qualify as exempt learned professionals because
an advanced specialized academic degree is not a standard prerequisite for entry into the
field.").
41 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, WAGE AND HOUR DIVISION OPINION LETTER (July
27, 1995).
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treatment.
It is true that there are some externship programs (for example,
in prosecutorial offices) that may qualify for special court permission
that enables law students to practice law in limited contexts (for exam-
ple, before a specific court or in a specific type of case). More broadly,
however, a law student is not permitted to actually practice law until
graduating from law school and obtaining a law license. Given these
circumstances, it is unlikely that the Department of Labor will find the
learned professional exemption applicable to law student externs.42
At a minimum, there is no existing regulation or interpretation that
would allow it to do so. Exemptions to the FLSA are narrowly con-
strued, and the burden is on the employer to demonstrate that an ex-
emption applies.43
2. The Exemption For Volunteers At Public And Non-Profit
Agencies
By statute, the FLSA provides that the term "employee" under
the Act does not include an individual who "volunteers to perform
services for a public agency" without being paid wages, as long as the
individual is not performing the type of services for which the agency
also pays him.4 4 The Department of Labor has defined a "volunteer"
for purposes of this provision as a person who provides hours of ser-
vice "for civic, charitable or humanitarian reasons, without promise,
expectation or receipt of compensation." 4 5 For example, the FLSA
would not apply to individuals who volunteer to provide personal ser-
vices to the sick or elderly in hospitals or nursing homes, to help in a
school library or cafeteria, or to work with retarded or handicapped
children or disadvantaged youth." 46 The Department notes, as well,
that assuming the legal requirements are otherwise met, there are no
restrictions under FLSA on the "types of services which private indi-
viduals may volunteer to perform for public agencies." 47
While the statute is limited by its terms to volunteers for "public
agencies," the Department of Labor has, although somewhat ob-
liquely, extended the same exemption to volunteers for private non-
profit agencies, where the individual is motivated to volunteer by the
same charitable goals articulated in the statute. While this policy is
42 Eric M. Fink, No Money, Mo' Problems: Why Unpaid Law Firm Externships Are
Illegal and Unethical, 47 U.S.F. L. REv. 435, 443 (2013) (noting that, unlike attorneys, law
students are not categorically exempt from the FLSA under the DOL's regulations").
43 See, e.g., Havey v. Homebound Mortgage, Inc., 547 F.3d 158, 163 (2nd Cir. 2008).
44 FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(4)(A).
45 FLSA, 29 C.F.R. § 553.101(a).
46 FLSA, 29 C.F.R. § 553.104(b).
47 FLSA, 29 C.F.R. § 553.104(a).
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not included in the regulations, the Department has in an opinion let-
ters referred to applying the "volunteer" exemption to private individ-
uals who volunteer at non-profit organizations. Importantly, however,
the Department has been clear in its position that the volunteer ex-
emption under FLSA is limited to not-for-profit groups, and that "em-
ployees may not volunteer services to private sector for-profit
employers. "48
3. The Judicial And Administrative Exception For "Trainees"
Despite the breadth of the statutory definition of an "employee"
under the FLSA, the Department of Labor has long recognized that
not everyone who provides services at a workplace can be deemed an
"employee." Significantly here, the Department does not view as an
"employee" a person who is at a work site as part of a bona fide
"trainee" program. The exclusion from the FLSA for "trainees" is not
set out in the statute, but rather originates from a 1947 United States
Supreme Court case interpreting the Act, Walling v. Portland Termi-
nal.4 9 That ruling has since been elaborated upon by the Department
of Labor through opinion letters and interpretive rulings.
While the Walling case is old, the principles that it established
remain vital.50 Because the Department of Labor and the federal
courts do not always agree on the proper application of the Walling
ruling, however, it is worth laying out in some greater detail the pa-
rameters of the Supreme Court's ruling in Walling, the Department's
interpretation of that ruling, and the varying federal court approaches.
(a) The Supreme Court's Ruling in the Walling Case
In Walling, the Department sought to force the railroad to pay
minimum wage to certain "trainees." In particular, the railroad gave a
"course in practical training" to prospective yard brakemen. Unless
applicants completed the training and were certified as competent,
they were not eligible to be hired by the railway. Applicants who
were accepted for the training course, which lasted seven or eight
days, were "turned over to a yard crew for instruction." Under this
supervision, the trainee would "first learn the routine activities by ob-
servation," and was then "gradually permitted to do actual work
under close scrutiny."
48 See http://www.dol.gov/elaws/esa/flsa/docs/volunteers.asp (online explanation of De-
partment of Labor position on "volunteers").
49 See Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148 (1947). There was a companion
case decided the same day against another railroad, ruling on the same basis. Walling v.
Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry., 330 U.S. 158 (1947).
50 See, e.g., Tony and Susan Alamo Foundation v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S. 290,
299-300 (1985) (applying principles established in Walling).
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The trainee's activities did not "displace any of the regular em-
ployees," who had to do "most of the work themselves, and must
stand immediately by to supervise whatever the trainees do." The
trainee's work did "not expedite the company business," but instead
could and sometimes did "actually impede and retard it." The rail-
road did not pay the trainees, and the trainees did not expect to be
paid for the training period (though trainees who were hired would
receive a retroactive allowance for the days spent in training).51
Although there was "no question that these trainees do work in
the kind of activities covered by the Act,"52 the Court declined to find
that the definition of an "employee" in the Act extended to such
"learners."53 Under these circumstances, the Supreme Court held, the
trainees were not "employees" subject to the requirements of FLSA.
The famous passage from the Walling decision (often quoted by the
Labor Department) states as follows:
The definition 'suffer or permit to work' was obviously not intended
to stamp all persons as employees who, without any express or im-
plied compensation agreement, might work for their own advantage
on the premises of another.
Otherwise, the Court went on, "all students would be employees of
the school or college they attended, and as such entitled to receive
minimum wages." 54
Importantly for our purposes, the Court made an express com-
parison to the type of training that might be provided in a school set-
ting. "Had these trainees taken courses in railroading in a public or
private vocational school, wholly disassociated from the railroad," the
Court emphasized, it could not reasonably be suggested that they
were "employees" of the school. Nor would this change, the Court
noted, if the school's graduates formed a labor pool from which the
railroad could draw. The Act was not intended to penalize railroads
for "providing,. free of charge, the same kind of instruction at a place
and in a manner which would most greatly benefit the trainees."55
Thus, the Court concluded, while the terms "employ" and "em-
ployee" are broad, they "cannot be interpreted so as to make a person
whose work serves only his own interest an employee of another per-
son who gives him aid and instruction."5 6 Emphasizing the unchal-
lenged findings in that case that the railroad received "no immediate
51 Walling, 330 U.S. at 149-150.
52 Id. at 150.
53 Id. at 151-152.
54 Id. at 152.
55 Id. at 153.
56 Id. at 152.
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advantage from any work done by the trainees," the Court held that
the trainees were not "employees" within the Act's meaning.57 The
Walling decision remains the governing precedent for assessing train-
ing and internship programs under the FLSA, and the decision is fre-
quently cited not only in modern Supreme Court decisional law, but in
many recent lower court decisions.58
(b) The Labor Department's Six-Part Test under Walling
Building on the Walling decision, beginning as early as 1967, the
Department of Labor developed a six-part test to determine when an
individual may engage in activities without pay at a covered work
place without giving rise to FLSA liability.59 The Department has
consistently applied this test since that time to assess the requirements
applicable under the FLSA to vocational training programs of differ-
ent types.60 The Labor Department's six-part test, long used in De-
partment opinion letters, has more recently been the subject of a
general information statement issued by the Department, known as
Fact Sheet #71, which addresses internships in particular. 61
The information statement reflects the recent rise of unpaid in-
ternships at for-profit businesses, a trend further fueled by the eco-
nomic recession that began around 2009.62 In some fairly notorious
cases, unpaid interns were used at for-profit businesses, such as film
studios and magazine publishers, to do menial labor and act as general
"gophers." 63 In 2010, the Department of Labor issued Fact Sheet #71,
which is specifically designed to provide employers with "general in-
formation to help determine whether interns must be paid the mini-
mum wage and overtime under the Fair Labor Standards Act for the
57 Id. at 153.
58 See, e.g., Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures Inc., 2013 WL 2495140 (S.D.N.Y. June 11,
2013) (applying FLSA to unpaid interns at motion distribution company); DeMayo v.
Palms West Hospital, 918 F. Supp.2d 1287 (S.D. Fla. 2013) (applying FLSA to unpaid stu-
dent interns at medical facility).
59 See, e.g., Reich v. Parker Fire Protection District, 992 F.2d 1023, 1026 (10th Cir.
1993) ("The six criteria in the Secretary's test were derived almost directly from [Walling]
and have appeared in Wage and Hour Administrator opinions since at least 1967.").
60 Id. See also Solis v. Laurelbrook Sanitarium and School, Inc., 642 F.3d 518, 524 (6th
Cir. 2011) (noting that the Labor Department's six-part test was publicly disclosed in its
Field Operations Handbook issued in 1980).
61 See Fact Sheet #71, supra note 8.
62 See, e.g., Jessica L. Curiale, America's New Glass Ceiling: Unpaid Internships, the
Fair Labor Standards Act, and the Urgent Need for Change, 61 HASTINGs L.J. 1531 (2010)
(noting that "unpaid internships are increasing in the United States, and one can surmise
that they will become even more common as the economy continues to deteriorate").
63 Some of these types of unpaid internships later led to federal court decisions under
the FLSA. See, e.g., Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc., 2013 WL 2495140 (S.D.N.Y.
June 11, 2013) (unpaid interns at movie productions); Wang v. Hearst Corporation, 2013
WL 1903787 (S.D.N.Y. May 8, 2013) (unpaid interns at magazines).
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services that they provide to 'for-profit' private sector employers."
While the Fact Sheet does not define "interns," it is apparent that the
types of positions being addressed would also include what law school
typically refer to as "externs" or "clinical externs." 6 4 As noted, the
Labor Department's discussion in Fact Sheet is targeted to placements
at for-profit institutions. 6 5
Fact Sheet #71 makes clear that there are some circumstances in
which individuals who participate in internships at for-profit entities
"may do so without compensation." At the same time, the Depart-
ment cautions that internships in the for-profit sector will "most often
be viewed as employment, unless the test" articulated by the Depart-
ment for trainees is met. The exclusion from the FLSA for such pro-
grams is "necessarily quite narrow because the FLSA's definition of
'employ' is very broad." 66
According to the Department, all six of the following criteria
must be present for such an internship program to be excluded from
the FLSA's requirements (these are reprinted verbatim below):
1) The internship, even though it includes actual operation of the
facilities of the employer, is similar to training which would be
given in an educational environment;
2) The internship experience is for the benefit of the intern;
3) The intern does not displace regular employees, but works
under close supervision of existing staff;
4) The employer that provides the training derives no immediate
advantage from the activities of the intern; and on occasion its
operations may actually be impeded;
5) The intern is not necessarily entitled to a job at the conclusion
of the internship; and
6) The employer and the intern understand that the intern is not
entitled to wages for the time spent in the internship.
If all of the factors listed above are met, in the Department's eyes, "an
employment relationship does not exist," and the FLSA's minimum
wage and overtime provisions do not apply to the intern. 67 To the
extent the Department may be considering an enforcement action
under the FLSA, or may be asked to give an opinion of the legality of
an externship program, it will apply this six-factor test.
64 See Fact Sheet #71, supra note 8, at 1 (the Fact Sheet addresses "individuals who
participate in 'for-profit' private sector internships or training programs" to serve their
own interests, such as "interns who receive training for their own educational benefit").
65 The brief discussion in a footnote to Fact Sheet #71 about the FLSA status of intern-
ships at government agencies and non-profit organizations is discussed infra at Part IV.
66 Fact Sheet #71, supra note 8, at 1.
67 Id.
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(c) The Federal Courts' Application of the Walling Case
As noted, however, the federal courts take a variety of ap-
proaches to the Walling decision. While some Circuits apply the De-
partment of Labor's six-factor test, others do not agree that the
Department of Labor's six-part test is a correct application of Walling
or the FLSA. Thus, the Department's interpretation is given varying
degrees of deference when an internship or training program ends up
as the subject of a court case under the statute, depending on the par-
ticular jurisdiction in which the federal suit has arisen. Some courts
reject the Department's approach outright in favor of a different legal
test.
As a legal matter, the extent to which courts must defer to the
Department's six-part test as a binding interpretation of the FLSA is
affected by the fact that this interpretative statement (and the opinion
letters that preceded it) were not the result of a formal agency pro-
cess, such as an agency adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemak-
ing. Rather, they resulted from an informal agency process. The
Department itself describes Fact Sheet #71 simply as "general infor-
mation," not to be considered "in the same light as official statements
of position contained in the regulations." 6 8 At the same time, as a
matter of administrative law, Fact Sheet #71 stands as an interpreta-
tive ruling that is entitled to some degree of deference by the courts.
Where an agency is charged with implementing a statutory
scheme, and the statute leaves an implicit or explicit gap as to a partic-
ular issue, the enforcing agency's resolution of that issue through for-
mal channels such as adjudication or rulemaking must be followed by
the courts so long as the agency's interpretation is "reasonable" (so-
called "Chevron deference"). 69 By contrast, where the agency's inter-
pretation has been issued through less formal channels - as it was here
- the courts will consider the agency's reading of the statute, but are
not bound by it. In these circumstances, the courts will give the
agency so-called "Skidmore deference,"70 which treats such agency
pronouncements as a "body of experience and informed judgment to
which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance," even if
68 Id. at 2.
69 See Chevron U.S. A. Inc. v. Nat'l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-44
(1984).
70 See Skidmore v. Swift, 323 U.S. 134 (1944) (discussing degree of judicial deference to
be given to the Labor Department's legal interpretation as expressed in an FLSA opinion
letter); see also, Barfield v. New York City Health and Hospitals Corp., 537 F.3d 132, 149
(2d Cir. 2008) (noting that Department of Labor opinion letters and similar pronounce-
ments "do not command Chevron deference" but represent a "body of experience and
informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance").
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"not controlling on the courts."71
While this is less deferential to the agency's interpretation than the
type of judicial deference due to agency regulations under Chevron,
such agency pronouncements are also entitled to a "measure of re-
spect" from the courts.72
With respect to the Labor Department's fairly rigid six-part test
for valid "trainee" programs that are excluded from FLSA coverage,
the courts have given this interpretation of the FLSA varying degrees
of deference. Some courts have given the Department's interpreta-
tion full deference, while others have treated it as providing some gui-
dance, and yet others have given the Department's approach virtually
no weight.73 There are three basic approaches taken by the courts.
First, some courts simply apply the Department of Labor's test as ar-
ticulated in Fact Sheet #71 (and the Department's earlier opinion let-
ters). The Fifth Circuit, for example, gives "considerable deference" to
the Labor Department's six-part test and applies that test to deter-
mine FLSA challenges brought in connection with training
programs.74
Second, and at the other extreme, some courts reject outright the
Department's six-factor test. The Fourth Circuit, for example, rejects
the Department's interpretation as inconsistent with the Walling deci-
sion, and applies its own judicially-developed test to decide such chal-
lenges.75 That court uses a much simpler test to assess the validity of
71 In Skidmore, the Supreme Court held that (323 U.S. at 140):
We consider that the rulings, interpretations, and opinions of the Administrator
under this Act, while not controlling on the courts by reason of their authority, do
constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants
may properly resort for guidance. The weight of such a judgment in a particular case
will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its
reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those fac-
tors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.
72 See, e.g., Federal Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 399 (2008) (noting that
an enforcing agency's policy statements laid out in its internal policy manual are entitled to
a "measure of respect" from the courts, even under the less deferential Skidmore
standard).
73 See generally, Reich v. Parker Fire Protection District, 992 F.2d 1023. 1026 (10th Cir.
1993) (describing different patterns of court approaches to the deference, if any, due to
Fact Sheet #71); Solis v. Laurelbrook Sanitarium and School, Inc., 642 F.3d 518, 525-26 (6th
Cir. 2011) (same).
74 See, e.g., Atkins v. General Motors Corp., 701 F.2d 1124, 1128 (5th Cir. 1983) (apply-
ing Labor Department's six-part test to decide challenge by trainees at motor production
plant asserting that they performed productive work and thus were "employees" entitled
to pay); Donovan v. American Airlines, Inc., 686 F.2d 267, 273 (5th Cir. 1982) (applying
Labor Department's six-part test to support court's conclusion that flight attendant train-
ees and reservation sales agent trainees were not "employees").
75 McLaughlin v. Ensley, 877 F.2d 1207, 1209 n.2 (4th Cir. 1989) (noting that "[w]e do
not rely on the formal six-part test issued by" the Labor Department's Wage and Hour
Division). In that case, which concerned an unpaid week-long orientation for vending ma-
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an employment-related training program: It asks only "whether the
employee or the employer is the primary beneficiary of the trainee's
labor."76 The same "primary beneficiary" approach has been ex-
pressly adopted by the Sixth Circuit in place of the Department's six-
part test,77 and implicitly adopted by the Eighth Circuit.78
The primary beneficiary test is a much more flexible, less for-
mulaic approach that balances the benefits to the host and the extern,
rather than applying a list of specific criteria. The main point of dif-
ference between this approach and the Labor Department's six-factor
test comes down to the question of what benefit the employer may
permissibly derive from the extern's workplace participation. While
the Labor Department test requires that the employer derive "no im-
mediate advantage" from the extern's services (whatever that may
mean), the courts using the "primary beneficiary" approach recognize
that an employer may derive some benefit from an extern's unpaid
efforts, and requires instead that the primary beneficiary of the rela-
tionship be the unpaid extern, rather than the employer. 79
Finally, some other federal courts apply a middle-of-the-road,
blended approach. The Tenth Circuit, for example, uses the factors
identified in the Department of Labor's six-part test as relevant fac-
tors in assessing the "totality of the circumstances" as to whether a
person designated as an unpaid trainee is actually an employee under
the FLSA. However, that court does not require that all six factors be
present to find a training program valid, as would the Department.80
In short, there is little agreement among the courts on whether
the Labor Department's six-part test is the correct approach in decid-
chine workers, the question of the proper degree of deference to the Department's inter-
pretation of the statute was a central issue. Id. at 1209. The district court had applied the
Labor Department's six-part test to find that the training program was valid. Over a dis-
sent, the Fourth Circuit panel reversed this ruling, finding that the district court had not
used the "proper legal inquiry." Id.
76 Id. at 1209.
77 Solis v. Laurelbrook Sanitarium and School, Inc., 642 F.3d 518, 524-29 (6th Cir.
2011).
78 See Blair v. Wills, 420 F.3d 823, 829 (8th Cir. 2005) (rejecting challenge under the
FLSA brought by students in reform school who were required to perform chores on the
ground that the chores "were primarily for the students' . . . benefit"). In the Blair case,
the court did not discuss the appropriate test to apply, and there is no express rejection of
the Department's six-part test.
79 See, e.g., Solis, 642 F.3d at 525 (criticizing the "overly rigid" six-part test articulated
by the Department of Labor and concluding that the "ultimate inquiry in a learning or
training situation is whether the employee is the primary beneficiary of the work
performed").
8o See Reich v. Parker Fire Protection District, 992 F.2d 1023, 1026-27 (10th Cir. 1993)
(applying the Labor Department's six-factor test to a training program challenge, but re-
jecting the Secretary of Labor's position that that six factors should be rigidly applied as an
"all or nothing" test).
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ing an FLSA challenge to a workplace training program. Whether or
not the courts will agree with the Department's approach in a given
case, however, it is clear that the Department of Labor itself has for
many years consistently applied the six-factor test to law school ex-
ternship programs and continues to do so (as evidenced by its very
recent exchange with the ABA). Because the Department has the
power to bring enforcement actions under the FLSA, and because
many jurisdictions either apply the Department's approach or give it
some deference, this Article will use the six-part test articulated by the
enforcement agency in assessing the appropriate design of law school
externship programs. Law schools in jurisdictions that have taken a
different, or more liberal, approach may feel comfortable following
that case law instead of the Department's relatively rigid and formalis-
tic test.
III. APPLICATION OF THE FLSA To LAw SCHOOL EXTERNSHIPS
AT FOR-PROFIT COMPANIES
In recent years, as noted, many law schools have initiated or ex-
panded programs offering their students the opportunity to serve as
externs at private companies or law firms."' While the clinical educa-
tion movement is rooted in the public interest arena - recognizing the
value of having law students exposed to working for clients who may
have pressing legal needs but no income to hire a lawyer - the recent
trend to expand externships to private practice settings is grounded in
a slightly different motivation. This trend reflects the recognition that
there are both educational benefits from and student demand for ex-
posure during law school to law practice experiences not only in pub-
lic interest settings, but also in a wide range of other environments,
including corporate offices and law firms, where the majority of law-
yers will end up practicing after graduation.8 2
Where law school externships are set in private, for-profit compa-
nies or firms - such as where students extern with in-house counsel
offices or for-profit law firms - the law student will almost certainly be
considered an "employee" unless one of the FLSA exemptions or ex-
81 See, e.g., Bernadette T. Feeley, Guiding Law Students Through For-Profit Field
Placements, 19 CLIN. L. REV. 57, 60 (2012) (noting that "many law school externship pro-
grams have added for-profit placements to their externship program offerings"); Berna-
dette T. Feeley, Examining the Use of For-Profit Placements in Law School Externship
Programs, 14 CLIN. L. REV. 37, 37 (2007) (to same effect).
82 See, e.g., Carl J. Circo, An Educational Partnership Model for Establishing, Structur-
ing, and Implementing a Successful Corporate Counsel Externship, 17 CLIN. L. REV. 99
(2010) (suggesting that corporate counsel externships programs in law schools can help
teach core competencies essential for commercial and business lawyers and rarely taught in
an experiential setting).
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clusions discussed above comes into play. Since such programs are
expressly designed to give law students hands-on experience with the
type of legal work that is otherwise provided for pay by lawyers and
law clerks, the services law students provide as externs would presum-
ably otherwise qualify them as employees.
Looking to the FLSA exemptions, as discussed above, a law stu-
dent extern will not be considered a "professional." Nor would a law
student externing at a for-profit company or firm qualify for the ex-
emption that applies to some "volunteers" at government agencies
and non-profit organizations. The key exclusion, in the for-profit set-
ting, is the recognized exclusion for "trainees" carved out from FLSA
coverage by judicial and agency interpretation. Law school extern-
ships that contemplate for-profit placements should thus be carefully
designed to meet the Labor Department's requirements for bona fide
training programs, which if properly designed are not subject to FLSA
wage and hours standards.
To understand the FLSA requirements as they apply to law
school externship programs in for-profit settings, this section will look
first at two opinion letters issued by the Department of Labor in the
context of law school programs in for-profit law firms and corporate
settings. Then, it will review how each of the six factors the Depart-
ment uses to judge bona fide training programs and internships are
likely to apply more generally in the context of unpaid legal extern-
ships in commercial settings beyond the law firm pro bono setting ad-
dressed in the ABA correspondence. Note, again, that this part of the
Article is limited to considering an unpaid externship in which a law
student works in a for-profit business. Applicability of the FLSA to
non-profit settings will be considered in Part IV.
A. Department of Labor Opinion Letters Addressing Legal
Trainees in For-Profit Settings
Recently, discussions among law school externship coordinators
were sparked by an exchange of correspondence between the Depart-
ment of Labor and the American Bar Association (ABA).83 The let-
ters addressed certain law school programs - specifically, those that
allow students to volunteer at private law firms in work is limited to
the firm's non-fee-generating pro bono matters. This letter has raised
83 See Letter from Laurel G. Bellows, President, American Bar Association, to Patricia
Smith, Solicitor, U.S. Department of Labor (May 28, 2013) [hereinafter ABA Letter to
DOL], http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/images/news/PDF/MPSLetter_
reFLSA_091213.pdf; Letter from M. Patricia Smith, Solicitor of Labor, U.S. Department of
Labor, to Laurel G. Bellows, Immediate Past President, American Bar Association (Sep-
tember 12, 2013) [hereinafter DOL Letter to ABA], http://www.americanbar.org/content/
dam/aba/uncategorized/GAO/2013may28_probonointerns_1.authcheckdam.pdf.
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some alarm about the broader significance of the Department's state-
ments. However, years before the Department's recent exchange with
the ABA, it expressly addressed - and approved - a training program
that contemplated placing law students as unpaid "law clerks" work-
ing at in-house counsel offices in a "corporate setting." 84 While this
opinion letter was issued many years earlier than the recent exchange,
the Department applied its six-factor test to the facts posited by the
inquirer.85 This section will examine both of these letters, and what
they tell us about how the Department of Labor may view externship
programs in for-profit settings.
1. The ABA-DOL Exchange About Pro Bono Volunteers at For-
Profit Firms
In 2013, the Department of Labor responded to an inquiry from
the ABA concerning the applicability of the FLSA to law school pro-
grams under which students provide legal services without pay at pri-
vate law firms, working exclusively on pro bono matters. While the
Department approved such placements as permissible exceptions to
FLSA wage and hour requirements, the question, for many readers,
was what the Department might be suggesting more generally about
law school externship programs in the private sector - and whether all
legal externship programs must be limited to pro bono matters.
In looking at both the ABA's inquiry and the Department's re-
sponse, it does not appear that the Department intended to limit the
law school externships that would qualify for the FLSA exclusion, nor
that it was imposing any requirement that all such programs permit
law students to work only on pro bono matters (whether at law firms
or companies). Rather, the Department was answering the specific
question posed by the ABA. The Department has not, to the author's
knowledge, expressed the view - in writing, at least - that law school
externship placements at private law firms are unlawful unless the law
student is limited to work on pro bono cases. 86
Because this letter is easy to misread, it is useful to consider the
ABA letter that led to the Department's response before turning to an
explanation of the position that the Department of Labor took in an-
swer to the ABA's question about legal externships.
84 See U.S. Department of Labor, Wage and Hour Division, Opinion Letter (January
28, 1988) (opinion letter concerning application of FLSA to a "proposed law clerk extern
program" in a "corporate setting") [hereinafter DOL Letter on Corporate Law Externs]),
1988 WL 1534561 (DOL WAGE-HOUR).
85 Id.
86 It is not entirely clear what discussions the Department had with the ABA in private
meetings on the issues, but it would be surprising if the Department came up with such a
position on its own initiative, for the reasons discussed below.
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The exchange was initiated in May of 2013, when then-ABA
President Laurel Bellows wrote to the Department of Labor. Her let-
ter suggests that the ABA was motivated to write the letter because it
had observed that some private law firms were reluctant, because of
FLSA concerns, to allow law students to work on pro bono matters as
unpaid interns at the firms, relationships that many law schools have
been pursuing as one option to satisfy law school pro bono require-
ments.87 Following up on some initial discussions between the staff of
both organizations, the ABA President asked, in particular, for an in-
formal letter providing law firms and law schools with assurance that
the Department would "not take legal enforcement action" against
private law firms and companies who use unpaid interns to assist with
pro bono matters. In particular, the ABA posited a program in which
(a) the interns are law students,88 (b) the law school serves as an inter-
mediary in arranging the placement, (c) the intern works only on pro
bono matters in which the firm (or company) will not derive any "di-
rect financial benefit" for the intern's work, (d) the internship pro-
vides an "educational experience related to the practice of law"
(whether or not the student earns academic credit), and (e) the intern
hosts provide written assurance that these conditions will be met.8 9
Because the ABA's immediate focus was on satisfaction of a law
school pro bono obligation - governed by Standard 301(b) - and not
on law school externship programs, the letter was, naturally focused
on an uncredited pro bono program rather than an externship pro-
gram carrying academic credit.90
The Solicitor of Labor, M. Patricia Smith, responded to the ABA
in September, 2013. She indicated, first, that as a general matter, a
properly designed law school private sector internship program may at
times be excluded from FLSA coverage: "There are some circum-
stances under which individuals who participate in 'for-profit' private
sector internships or training programs may do so without compensa-
tion." In making this determination, she explained, the question is
whether the program meets the six factors outlined in the test applied
87 See ABA Letter to DOL, supra note 83, at 1 (noting that ABA Accreditation Stan-
dard 301(b) requires law schools to offer "substantial opportunities for student participa-
tion in pro bono activities," and that beyond pro bono opportunities in the non-profit and
government sectors, "law schools would also like to place their students with for-profit law
firms (including corporate legal offices) to work on pro bono matters").
88 While the ABA's letter also mentioned including in such programs recent law gradu-
ates who had not yet passed the bar, the ABA indicated in its own inquiry that the ABA's
Employment and Labor Section did not support allowing law graduates to serve as unpaid
interns. See ABA Letter to DOL, supra note 83, at 2.
89 ABA Letter to DOL, supra note 83, at 1.
90 See id. (noting that "FLSA uncertainty inhibits law firms from offering students the
opportunity to work on pro bono matters in a real-life practice setting").
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by the Department to internship and training programs (as laid out in
Fact Sheet #71). If all of these factors are met, "an employment rela-
tionship does not exist under the FLSA."91
Solicitor Smith went on to provide even more targeted guidance
with respect to the particular private sector program suggested in the
ABA's letter. After repeating the conditions posited by the ABA -
including the limitation that the intern will work only on non-fee-gen-
erating pro bono matters at the private law firm - Solicitor Smith ana-
lyzed the application of the Department's six-factor test to these facts.
Her letter concludes that "an unpaid internship with a for-profit law
firm structured in such a manner as to provide the student with pro-
fessional experience in furtherance of their education, involving exclu-
sively non-fee generating pro bono matters[,] would not be considered
employment subject to the FLSA."92
Read in isolation, the statement that unpaid internships "involv-
ing exclusively non-fee generating pro bono matters" would not vio-
late the FLSA might suggest to some readers that working only on pro
bono matters is a necessary condition for such programs to comply
with the Act. In fact, however, reading both the ABA's letter in con-
junction with the Department's response, it is apparent that the De-
partment did not come up with this language itself as a condition the
Department wished to impose on permissible law school externships.
Rather, the pro bono limitation was a fact posited by the ABA in its
original request. The Department was simply using the facts that had
been provided by the ABA to answer the precise question that had
been posed.
More broadly, the Department's response indicates that the De-
partment will apply the same six-factor test to law school externship
programs that it applies more generally to other internship and train-
ing programs.93 Private placements of law students in unpaid extern-
ships at for-profit companies and law firms should thus be permissible
to the extent the externship placement satisfies all six factors.94 More-
over, this conclusion is consistent with the past opinion letters issued
by the Department, which have applied the six-factor test to other law
school internships in the private sector, which do not involve limita-
91 DOL Letter to ABA, supra note 83, at 1.
92 Id. at 2. The Department noted, in agreement with the ABA's Labor Employment
Law Section, that allowing law graduates to serve as unpaid interns at a private law firm
poses very different issues under the FLSA, and would require a different analysis. Id. at
3.
93 See DOL Letter to ABA, supra note 83, at 1 ("The FLSA does ... permit individuals
to participate in unpaid internships or training programs conducted by for-profit entities if
certain criteria are met.").
94 Id.
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tions to pro bono work.
2. DOL's Prior Opinion Letter on Unpaid Corporate Law Office
Externships
In a lesser-known exchange, in 1988, the Department of Labor
considered the applicability of the FLSA to a proposed training pro-
gram that would place law students as unpaid "law clerks" working at
in-house counsel offices in corporate settings.95 The inquirer de-
scribed the proposed program as "clinical in nature," comparable to
the training "received by medical students who participate in hospital
extern programs." The idea was for law students to "gain practical
experience in a corporate setting addressing real business problems
and interacting with 'clients."' The advantage to the students, who
had no expectation of being paid from the program, and were not eli-
gible to be hired until at least three months after the program ended,
was that it would increase their "marketability as paid law clerks or in-
house counsel." 96 The corporate externship program as described by
the inquirer qualified, in the Department's view, as a legitimate edu-
cation or training program "designed to provide students with profes-
sional experience in the furtherance of their education and training
and . . . academically oriented for their benefit." Under these cir-
cumstances, the Department of Labor concluded that the program
would qualify as a permissible training program excluded from FLSA
coverage if used for currently enrolled students, but not for "after
graduation" internships, which would be employment relationships
that must be paid.97 Significantly, in terms of the possible benefits to
the host company, the Department emphasized, the "corporate law
office has substantial supervisory responsibilities which offsets any ad-
vantage it might otherwise be perceived to receive." 98 Hence, rather
than holding the corporation to a stringent standard that they receive
"no advantage" from the work of the intern, the Department ap-
peared to examine the broader question of whether a net advantage
accrued to the corporation.
The Department of Labor's opinions in the 1988 and 2013 opin-
ion letters are directly relevant precedents that can help law schools
understand and predict how the Department of Labor would be likely
to view other types of externships at private for-profit companies and
firms. These considerations are discussed further below, in the expla-
nation of how each of the six factors might apply in the context of law
95 DOL Letter on Corporate Externships, supra note 84.
96 Id. at 1.
97 Id.
98 Id.
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school externship programs in the private sector more generally.
B. Applying The DOL's Six Factors To Other Legal
Externs At For-Profit Entities
Going beyond the relatively narrow program posited by the ABA
to legal externships in commercial settings more generally, the combi-
nation of Fact Sheet #71 and the Department of Labor opinion letters
suggests that the Department would be likely to apply the six factors
as follows:
1. Factor One: Similarity to Training in an Educational
Environment
In this factor, the Department of Labor considers whether the
externship, although it includes the "actual operation of the facilities"
of the employer, is "similar to training which would be given in an
educational environment." 99 This factor is directly related to the
Walling Court's emphasis that where an employer provides trainees
with the same kind of instruction that would be given at a training
school, but "at a place and in a manner which would most greatly
benefit the trainees," this does not create an employment
relationship. 00
The Department of Labor has emphasized several things with re-
gard to Factor One. In general, "the more an internship is structured
around a classroom or academic experience as opposed to the em-
ployer's actual operations, the more likely the internship will be
viewed as an extension of the individual's educational experience."1 01
Recall here, by way of background, that there are two different types
of training programs that may potentially be at issue: free-standing
employment training programs offered by an employer (as in Walling
itself); and training programs undertaken at a field site but sponsored
by an educational institution as part of a course of study, as with law
school externship programs.102
Even in the case of free-standing work training programs - such
as where an airline offers a six-week training program at the airline
for would-be flight attendants - the courts have approved such pro-
grams as exceptions to FLSA's wage and overtime requirements, at
99 See Fact Sheet #71, supra note 8, at 1.
100 Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148, 153 (1947).
101 Fact Sheet #71, supra note 8, at 2.
102 See, e.g., Fink, supra note 42 (while arguing that unpaid legal internships should not
be permitted, the author limits his argument to internships arranged with law firms di-
rectly, recognizing that "students participating in for-credit law school externship programs
are likely to be excluded from FLSA coverage under the DOL test").
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times over the Department of Labor's objection. 03 Moreover, the
Department's pronouncements suggest that the agency itself views
training programs that are part of an accompanying degree or study
program at a college or university as more likely to comply with the
FLSA than trainee programs sponsored by a private sector company.
Key facts mentioned by the Department as marks of a legitimate edu-
cational training program include whether "a college or university ex-
ercises oversight over the internship program and provides
educational credit."104 It is also significant if the externship "provides
the individual with skills that can be used in multiple employment set-
tings," as opposed to skills particular to one employer's business
operations.105
2. Factor Two: Experience Is For Extern's Benefit
In this factor, the Department of Labor considers whether the
externship experience "is for the benefit of the [extern]."106 As with a
number of the factors, Factor Two is closely related to another issue,
considered in Factor Four, which looks to whether the relationship
provides any "immediate advantage" to the employer. In Fact Sheet
#71, for example, the Department of Labor does not discuss these fac-
tors separately, but instead combines them in a section entitled, in
relevant part, "The Primary Beneficiary of the Activity."107 The im-
portant thing being expressed in both inquiries is whether the extern
relationship is motivated and designed to benefit the extern rather
than the employer.
The courts have been clear, in this regard, that the contemplated
"benefit" to the law student should go beyond the benefit that is in-
volved in any ordinary job placement, such as the resume value of the
position. Instead, the law student should benefit by virtue of the spe-
cial instructional value of a carefully structured externship. 08 The ex-
103 See, e.g., Donovan v. American Airlines, Inc., 686 F.2d 267 (5th Cir. 1982) (finding
that training programs offered by American Airlines under which flight attendant and sales
agent trainees were not paid were permissible under FLSA; rejecting Department of Labor
position); Ulrich v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 2009 WL 364056 (W.D. Wash. 2009) (finding that
training programs offered by Alaska Airlines under which flight attendant trainees were
not paid were permissible under FLSA); Reich v. Parker Fire Protection District, 992 F.2d
1023 (10th Cir. 1993) (finding that firefighter training program under which trainees were
not paid was permissible under FLSA; rejecting Department of Labor position).
104 Fact Sheet #71, supra note 8, at 2.
105 Id.
106 Id. at 1.
107 Id. at 2.
108 See, e.g., Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc., 2013 WL 2495140 (S.D.N.Y. June 11,
2013) (where the benefits from the unpaid internships, such as resume listings and job
references, were "incidental to working in the office like any other employee and were not
the result of internships intentionally structured to benefit them," this does not support an
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ternship should be "engineered to be more educational than a paid
position." 109 In any job, an extern will learn something about the
workplace, of course, but the point made by the courts is that a paid
extern who is merely assigned to make coffee and deliver mail as
needed will not learn any more than a paid assistant in the same job.
It is only when the worksite designs the externship so as to teach the
intern, rather than cater to the immediate needs of the employer, that
FLSA compliance is excused.
3. Factor Three: Close Supervision And Avoiding Employee
Displacement
In this factor, the Department of Labor considers two distinct,
but related considerations that support the application of the FLSA
"trainee" exclusion: that the extern is "closely supervised" by the ex-
isting staff; and that the extern "does not displace regular employ-
ees."110 Again, this Factor tends to overlap with other parts of the
Department's test, since the close degree of supervision by existing
staff required as an extern host, and the amount of time required for
supervision, will also mean that the employer is at times "actually ...
impeded" by hosting the extern, as relevant to Factor Four."1 '
In terms of the supervision that is contemplated, in the seminal
Walling case, the trainees were allowed to participate in "hands-on"
work as railroad brakemen, but there was a regular employee standing
by to take over at any time.112 Interestingly, the Labor Department
has found a similar degree of supervision inherent for trainees in a
legal setting, noting that "legal representation and licensing require-
ments necessitate that unlicensed law students receive close and con-
stant supervision from the firm's licensed attorneys."11 3 In other
words, because any work performed by a law student cannot be used
as the basis for a court filing or other work product of the firm without
a licensed lawyer having endorsed and approved it, there will perforce
be a high degree of supervision of student externs in a legal externship
setting.114
exclusion from the wage requirements of FLSA).
109 Id.
110 Fact Sheet #71, supra note 8, at 1.
111 Id. at 1.
112 Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148, 149-50 (1947) (the trainee is "gradu-
ally permitted to do actual work under close scrutiny" and regular employees "must stand
immediately by to supervise whatever the trainees do").
113 DOL Letter to ABA, supra note 83, at 2.
114 Of course, a law school should ensure that supervision of student externs on-site is
not only theoretically required (as a by-product of attorney licensing requirements) but is
actually provided. See DOL Letter to ABA, supra note 83, at 2 (where an extern "receives
minimal supervision and guidance from the firm's licensed attorneys," the extern would be
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As for the "displacement" issue, the Department's concern is ex-
pressed this way: "If an employer uses interns as substitutes for regu-
lar workers or to augment its existing workforce during specific time
periods," the interns should be paid at least minimum wage and enti-
tled to overtime protections. Likewise, if an employer "would have
hired additional employees or required existing staff to work addi-
tional hours had the interns not performed the work," again, the in-
terns will be viewed as employees under FLSA."i5 The concept here,
obviously, is that an employer can't use a training program as an at-
tempt to save money by using unpaid student interns in place of hiring
employees, thereby circumventing federal wage and hour laws.
In a legal setting, similarly, the Department has emphasized that
if a law student externs "displaces regular employees (including sup-
port staff)" the extern will be treated as an employee.116 Again, the
issue of displacing regular employees is closely connected with other
factors, including the emphasis on the educational value of the extern-
ship, and the lack of "immediate advantage" to the employer. If a
legal extern is being given copying or filing assignments or routine and
repetitive work such as a massive document review project - that is,
work that would ordinarily be assigned to a secretary or paralegal -
this is likely to be a red flag to the Labor Department. The same is
true if externs are being used to perform the work of regular staff
members who are out sick or on vacation, or are retained by a com-
pany or law firm instead of hiring contract lawyers on a particularly
demanding case or stage of litigation.
Again, this issue is connected not only to the Department's con-
cerns about protecting employees (including those who would have
been hired for pay, but for the unpaid intern) but also to the law
school's concerns about educational value. The work given to a stu-
dent extern should be driven by careful thought about what will best
teach the extern about some aspect of what lawyers do in practice,
using actual work projects done in the business operation. Project as-
signments should not be driven by the company's staffing needs. The
difference can be subtle, so it is important that law school supervisors
and site supervisors be attuned to the point at which assignments cross
a line from educational to routine-and the point at which the extern
is being used to perform the company's work in place of a regular
employee.
considered an employee subject to FLSA). The degree of supervision provided by host
lawyers should be readily evident to the law school through its oversight role.
115 Fact Sheet #71, supra, note 8, at 2.
116 DOL Letter to ABA, supra note 83, at 2.
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4. Factor Four: No "Immediate Advantage" To Employer
In this factor, the Department of Labor considers whether the
employer who provides the training "derives no immediate advantage
from the activities of the intern" and on occasion "its operations may
actually be impeded."' 17 This factor is perhaps the most challenging
to understand and implement, particularly in a professional setting.
There is considerable tension in a professional setting between the
need to make the externship an educational experience - which, by its
nature, contemplates assigning the extern actual legal work that is
substantive in nature, and therefore potentially useful to the host or-
ganization - and the need to avoid an "immediate advantage" to the
host through the extern's work. The question, therefore, is what this
factor means for law school externships.
At one end, it is clear that an externship experience largely de-
voted to "shadowing" a practicing lawyer through the course of his or
her day should pass muster as a legitimate "trainee" program that
does not provide an "immediate advantage" to the employer, and is
thus excluded from FLSA coverage.118 A law student who is simply
accompanying and watching a lawyer as that lawyer goes about his or
her normal law-related tasks is, by definition, not doing productive
work for the employer. The problem, of course, is that such an ex-
ternship is of relatively limited use to the extern. It is only by actually
doing some of the tasks the practicing lawyer does that the extern will
fully learn from the field placement experience.
This is by far the most challenging issue in designing FLSA-com-
pliant externship programs. It clearly appears, from the Department's
letter to the ABA, that the Department understands and tolerates the
fact that a legal extern will not simply be observing lawyers by attend-
ing hearings or meetings with them as they go about their jobs. In-
stead, the Department contemplates, as part of a valid training
program for law students, that they will actually be "participating in"
substantive legal work, such as "drafting or reviewing documents." 119
Courts deciding such challenges often observe that host organization
may derive some benefit from the unpaid labor. It is clear that simply
creating goodwill (as with a law firm that sponsors a pro bono extern-
ship program), or investing in a future labor pool (as with job training
programs sponsored by an employer), do not count as the type of "im-
117 Fact Sheet #71, supra note 8, at 1.
118 See id. (noting that the FLSA is likely to recognize a bona fide educational program
for an internship in which the employer "is providing shadowing opportunities that allow
an intern to learn certain functions under the close and constant supervision of regular
employees, but the intern performs no or minimal work").
119 DOL Letter to ABA, supra note 83, at 2.
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mediate" advantages that will disqualify the training program from
the wage and overtime exception under the FLSA.220 The question
remains as to what an "immediate advantage" means.
As these letters suggest, it would be hard to design a meaningful
externship program in which the law students do not potentially pro-
vide some benefit to the host organization in doing the assigned work.
More importantly, however, precisely because legal work is demand-
ing and complex, the supervision and training required in overseeing a
legal extern will often involve a substantial commitment by the organ-
ization's staff. This is reinforced by the fact that, in the area of legal
work, any work product produced by an extern must presumably be
carefully reviewed, assessed, and adopted by a licensed attorney
before any reliance will be placed on that work product or the work
product shared with others - a factor highlighted by the Department
itself in responding to the ABA. 121
In the Department's earlier opinion letter addressing corporate
law office externships, the agency expressly highlighted the fact that
"the corporate law office has substantial supervisory responsibilities
which offsets any advantage it might otherwise be perceived to re-
ceive" from the extern's activities.122 The important thing, the Depart-
ment's letters suggest, is that the net advantage from the relationship
should benefit the intern, not the host organization. This focus on net
advantage is consistent, in this regard, with the approach taken by the
courts that emphasize whether the "primary benefit" accrues to the
trainee or the employer. 123 One key element in applying this Factor,
thus, is ensuring that the supervision provided by the host organiza-
tion is indeed robust, educational, and intensive.124
120 See, e.g., DOL Letter to ABA, supra note 83, at 2 (noting that "intangible, long-term
benefits such as general reputational benefits associated with pro bono activities" are not
considered the type of "immediate advantage" to a law firm that could weigh in favor of
applying FLSA wage requirements); Reich v. Parker Fire Protection Dist., 992 F.2d 1023,
1028 (10th Cir. 1993) (noting that "although we agree that the defendant derived an ulti-
mate advantage by creating a pool of prospective employees trained in its operations, this
is the intended result of any employer-sponsored training program," and thus cannot be
the type of "immediate advantage" that would require application of the FLSA).
121 See DOL Letter to ABA, supra note 83, at 2 (noting that "legal representation and
licensing requirements necessitate that unlicensed law students receive close and constant
supervision from the firm's licensed attorneys").
122 DOL Letter on Corporate Law Office Externs, supra note 84, at 1.
123 See, e.g., Reich v. Parker Fire Protection District, 992 F.2d 1023, 1028 (10th Cir.
1993) (noting, with respect to the "benefit of the trainees" and the "immediate advantage"
to the employer, that "a number of courts have considered these factors together, weighing
the relative benefits to each party, and we are persuaded that conducting the inquiry in this
fashion is both permissible and helpful.").
124 See, e.g., Marshall v. Baptist Hospital, Inc., 473 F. Supp. 465 (M.D. Tenn. 1979) (find-
ing FLSA applicable where hospital training program for radiology technicians was de-
signed to require substantial supervision, but the hospital "exploited the training program,
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At a minimum, Factor Four suggests that special FLSA consider-
ations come into play with law school externships that place students
at private law firms. One important issue, in this setting, is the ques-
tion of the pressures posed by law firm billable hour requirements
(and of billing by the hour more generally). There are two perceived
risks for externship programs in private law firms in particular: First,
because lawyers in private practice derive their income predominately
based on the number of hours billed, this can create pressures to give
supervisory responsibilities short shrift.'-m Second, and relatedly, law
firm managers may wish to bill clients for the time spent by the unpaid
externs on legal work, seeing an externship program as a potential
profit center. The Department of Labor specifically emphasized, in
the context of the externship program posited by the ABA, that were
the firm to have the law student work "on fee generating matters",
that is a factor that could create exposure under the FLSA, as could
the firm's provision of "minimal supervision and guidance from the
firm's licensed attorneys." 126
Aside from the clear problem raised for FLSA compliance if law
firms bill clients for work performed by unpaid externs, the question
remains whether it is either necessary or advisable as a legal matter to
limit any student law firm placements to work on pro bono matters.
Leaving aside any policy concerns or law school public service goals
(which are not the focus of this Article), there is no reason to con-
clude from the case law or the Department of Labor statements, that
limiting work to pro bono matters in law firm field placements is re-
quired by the FLSA. The question under the Department's test is not
what particular assignments the externs are given, but whether their
presence provides an "immediate advantage" to the law firm.
As a logical matter, if an extern were assigned to draft a memo,
even one that might potentially be useful to a client, the firm could
avoid any "immediate advantage" from the externship by declining to
bill the client for the extern's memo. Indeed, the law firm would
likely lose income in such a case, both because a supervising attorney
would have spent unbilled time supervising the extern's work, and
because the law firm would lose the opportunity to make the money
that could have been billed had a regular associate written the memo.
While it is true that a client who receives a law student extern's work
turning it to its own advantage" by having trainees work unsupervised and billing for their
time).
125 See generally Fink, supra note 42, at 448 n.80 (2013) (arguing that in private firms,
many lawyers "will decline to expend potentially billable time on non-billable training,
supervision and assessment of interns").
126 DOL Letter to ABA, supra note 83, at 2.
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product without paying for it derives an advantage, the focus of the
FLSA inquiry is on the employer not the client. If the law firm pro-
vides free work product to its clients, the benefit to the firm is, at
most, intangible and long-term, in the form of good will and client
loyalty, and is not likely to be considered an "immediate" benefit by
the courts or the Department.
Some further insight into what the Labor Department under-
stands as an impermissible "immediate advantage" is provided by
parsing its correspondence with the ABA about law student externs
who perform pro bono services within a law firm. The Labor Depart-
ment emphasized in its letter to the ABA not only that the services of
law student externs should not be used on "fee generating" pro bono
matters, but also that the work of externs should not be used to free
up firm lawyers so that they can bill time instead of working on pro
bono matters that don't pay fees. Such a practice provides a different
type of "immediate advantage" to the firm by allowing the firm to
earn more money by assigning externs to work on matters can't be
billed, thereby freeing up other attorneys to do billing work. This
elaboration suggests that, in each situation, the Department will look
to the financial reality, and consider whether the law firm in fact de-
rives an immediate bottom line financial benefit from hosting the ex-
tern. If so, the arrangement is likely to be suspect under the FLSA. In
short, the key here would seem to be that the intern's work be "non-
fee generating," a condition that can be enforced in other means than
limiting the student to pro bono matters. 127
5. Factor Five: Extern Is Not Entitled To A Job
In this factor, the Department of Labor looks to whether the ex-
tern is "entitled to a job at the conclusion" of the externship. 128 The
Department has elaborated this factor by emphasizing that the extern-
ship should be "of a fixed duration, established prior to the outset" of
the placement. 129 This factor should be easily satisfied. Both the De-
partment of Labor and the courts have accepted a variety of evidence
to show that Factor Five was met.130
At the same time, note that there is no prohibition in the FLSA
against an employer later offering a position to a law student extern
after the externship. Indeed, in the Walling case, as in the airline
training program cases, the entire program was intended to provide a
trained "labor pool" upon which the employer could later draw. The
127 Id. at 2.
128 Fact Sheet #71, supra note 8, at 1.
129 Id. at 2.
130 See DOL Letter to ABA, supra note 83, at 2.
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key is simply that the extern understands that he or she will "not nec-
essarily" receive a job out of the externship.
The idea here is that the extern should be protected against ex-
ploitation by dispelling any misunderstanding, on the extern's part,
that providing unpaid services will lead to a paying job with the com-
pany. The extern should undertake the position based on the educa-
tional value of the training, and the long-term benefits of having had
the experience, such as the resume value and the transferability of the
skills gained to other job settings.
6. Factor Six: Extern Is Not Entitled To Wages
In this factor, the Department of Labor considers whether the
employer and the extern understand "that the [extern] is not entitled
to wages" for the time spent in the externship. 131 Again, this Factor is
straightforward. To protect against exploitation of student externs,
the Department requires clarity at the outset to all concerned that the
extern is undertaking an unpaid position. This legal requirement
would be satisfied by having the externs sign a written externship con-
tract with the host organization acknowledging that they do not ex-
pect pay for their externship.132 The important thing is ensuring that
there is no confusion about the fact that the externship is an unpaid
position.
In conclusion, it should be possible to design a legal externship
program in which law students serve as externs, without pay, in for-
profit settings without running afoul of the FLSA's minimum wage
requirements. The key is designing a program that satisfies the De-
partment of Labor's six-part test for a bona fide training program -
and then administering that program consistent with the requirements
that have been established. Such a program could validly include field
placements both in corporate counsel offices and private law firms,
particularly if the special protections suggested by the Department for
law firm settings are included as part of the program conditions. In-
deed, the Department has already approved two such programs - in
the Department's recent opinion letter approving a law school extern-
ship program that places law students in law firms, without pay, as-
signed exclusively to pro bono matters, and in the Department's
earlier opinion letter approving a law school-connected externship
program that placed law students, without pay, in corporate counsel
131 Fact Sheet #71, supra note 8, at 1.
132 See, e.g., Ulrich v. Alaska Airlines Inc., 2009 WL 364056 (W.D. Wash. 2009) (where
the trainee signed a training contract which "specified that no wages would be paid during
training," this satisfied the requirement that both employer and trainee understand that
the training is unpaid).
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offices.
IV. APPLICATION OF FLSA To LAW SCHOOL EXTERNSHIPS
IN NON-PROFIT SETTINGS
While the data suggests that law school externships in for-profit
settings, as discussed above, have been growing, many more law
school externships are in non-profit or governmental settings. 133
Many law schools offer legal externships in the non-profit sector.
These may include field placements in government agency settings,
such as the offices of prosecutors and public defenders, or at govern-
ment agencies. Law schools also typically offer field placements in
non-profit organizations, such as legal services organizations or non-
profit legal groups working on particular causes. The question is
whether the Department of Labor could potentially consider such ex-
ternships subject to the FLSA where the law students are unpaid, as
they must be, to earn law school credit.
While Fact Sheet #71 is directed at the issue of unpaid internships
at for-profit enterprises, the Department of Labor also addresses,
briefly, the question of internships in the non-profit sector, concluding
that unpaid internships for state and local government agencies and
non-profit charitable groups are "generally permissible." The Depart-
ment reasoned that there are special statutory exemptions for certain
"volunteers," specifically for individuals who volunteer to perform
services for a state or local government agency or a private non-profit
food bank. 134 The Labor Department's Wage and Hour Division also
recognizes, by interpretation, an exception from the FLSA for "indi-
viduals who volunteer their time, freely and without anticipation of
compensation, for religious, charitable, civil or humanitarian purposes
to non-profit organizations."135 In other words, the Department has
in effect extended the statutory exemption for "volunteers" at public
agencies to cover volunteers at non-profit private groups as well.
Based on these principles, the Department concludes, "[u]npaid
133 See, e.g., Basu & Ogilvy, supra note 13, at 19 (noting that according to recent data,
eighty percent of externship courses limit placements to specific types of settings, most
commonly to not-for-profit settings, while twenty percent of externship courses have no
limitations on externship settings).
134 See 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(4)(A) and (e)(5). See generally 29 C.F.R. Part 553, Subpart B
(implementing the FLSA's statutory exception for "volunteers" at State and local govern-
mental agencies).
135 Fact Sheet #71, supra note 8, at 1-2 n.*. While Fact Sheet #71 was published in 2010,
that guidance has not yet been forthcoming. See, e.g., Anthony J. Tucci, Worthy Exemp-
tion? Examining How the DOL Should Apply the FLSA to Unpaid Interns at Nonprofits
and Government Agencies," 97 IoWA L. REV. 1363 (2012) (noting the open issue and sug-
gesting additional factors the Department of Labor should consider for unpaid internship
programs in the non-profit sector).
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internships in the public sector and for non-profit charitable organiza-
tions, where the intern volunteers without expectation of compensa-
tion, are generally permissible." Finally, the discussion notes that the
Wage and Hour Division "is reviewing the need for additional gui-
dance on internships in the public and non-profit sectors."1 36
The "volunteer" exemption noted in the Department's discussion
in Fact Sheet #71 is explained as follows by the Department on its
website:
Individuals who volunteer or donate their services, usually on a
part-time basis, for public service, religious or humanitarian objec-
tives, not as employees and without contemplation of pay, are not
considered employees of the religious, charitable or similar non-
profit organizations that receive their service.
For example, members of civic organizations may help out in a shel-
tered workshop; men's or women's organizations may send mem-
bers or students into hospitals or nursing homes to provide certain
personal services for the sick or elderly; parents may assist in a
school library or cafeteria as a public duty to maintain effective ser-
vices for their children or they may volunteer to drive a school bus
to carry a football team or school band on a trip. Similarly, an indi-
vidual may volunteer to perform such tasks as driving vehicles or
folding bandages for the Red Cross, working with disabled children
or disadvantaged youth, helping in youth programs as camp coun-
selors, scoutmasters, den mothers, providing child care assistance
for needy working mothers, soliciting contributions or participating
in benefit programs for such organizations and volunteering other
services needed to carry out their charitable, educational, or relig-
ious programs. 137
The question is how much comfort a law school should derive, in plac-
ing students at externships in public agencies and non-profit groups,
from the existence of the "volunteer" exemption above.
As noted above, a law school's externship programs may include
many placements in which the law student is, in fact, voluntarily work-
ing for a public agency or a non-profit organization without any ex-
pectation of pay. These would seem, from Fact Sheet #71, to be the
types of externships that the Department of Labor has found "gener-
ally permissible" under the "volunteer" exception.138 At the same
time, it is not entirely clear that the types of externship programs con-
136 Fact Sheet #71, supra note 8, at 2 n.*.
137 See http://www.dol.gov/elaws/esalflsa/docs/volunteers.asp.
138 While the statutory exemption is limited to state and local public agencies, presuma-
bly the Department of Labor would also extend the same "volunteer" principle to extern-
ships at federal government agencies, given that it has already applied this beyond the
literal language of the statute to encompass non-profit organizations.
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templated by a law school are a true "volunteer" program under the
statutory exemption, for two reasons.
First, unlike the typical volunteers addressed in the Department's
opinion letters, a law student will typically be serving as an extern not
for purely charitable motives, but in order to get professional training.
Often, he or she is actually receiving credit for the service as part of
his or her law school education, or otherwise fulfilling educational re-
quirements in order to graduate. This is not completely analogous to
someone who is purely "volunteering" out of the good of their heart
to benefit the public, or to help disadvantaged groups. In fact, these
externs look a lot more like "trainees" than like the Department's
examples of "volunteers." It may be that the policy behind this statu-
tory provision is served by allowing law students to voluntarily pro-
vide legal assistance to charitable groups, who unlike for-profit
businesses serve the public good, and are generally not well-heeled.
But still, law student externs gaining intensive professional training at
a prosecutor's office would seem, logically, to occupy a different em-
ployment niche than volunteer candy-stripers spending a few hours a
week at a local nursing home.
Second, even if the law student externs can be treated as volun-
teers, this does not necessarily end the analysis. There is no unassaila-
ble exemption from the FLSA for persons who "volunteer" to work
for public agencies or, by extension, non-profit groups. Rather, the
Department of Labor is sensitive to the fact that someone denomi-
nated a "volunteer" may in reality be used by the employer instead in
the role of a regular employee who is not being paid. The courts have
been clear that the FLSA status of an individual is not determined by
the job title the parties have chosen - a principle that should applies
to "volunteers" as much as to "interns" or "trainees."1 39 Instead, the
"economic reality" of the situation governs.140 Even here, where Con-
gress has spoken, the Department will likely be sensitive to the same
general concerns at play in its "trainee" decisions about the risks of
displacing paid workers, and preventing abuse of unpaid workers, that
would follow by over-extending the statutory "volunteer" exemption.
Where a person in the supposed role of a "volunteer" is in fact
infringing on the core functions of the FLSA - whether by displacing
regular paid employees, or being exploited by the employer - the De-
partment does not consider the exemption applicable. In Tony and
139 See, e.g., Marshall v. Baptist Hospital, Inc., 473 F. Supp. 465, 467 (M.D. Tenn. 1979)
(noting that the application of the FLSA is "not fixed by labels the parties may attach to
their relationship").
140 Id.
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Susan Alamo Foundation v. Secretary of Labor,141 the Labor Depart-
ment brought an enforcement action against a non-profit religious
foundation that used unpaid volunteers to staff some of the operations
run by the Foundation. In that case, the Supreme Court and the De-
partment of Labor disregarded both the ostensibly "charitable" na-
ture of the Foundation's operations and the protestations of the
volunteers themselves, and held that they were, in fact, "employees"
subject to the wage and overtime requirements of the FLSA.
The program run by the Foundation used individuals who had
been rehabilitated, such as former drug addicts, derelicts, or criminals,
to staff operations such as service stations, grocery stores, farms, and
construction companies, which provided the income to support the re-
ligious activities of the Foundation. 142 Known as "associates" rather
than employees, these individuals were provided with food, shelter,
and clothing, but no cash wages. The associates themselves took the
firm position that they "considered themselves volunteers who were
working only for religious and evangelical reasons."1 43
The Supreme Court held, first, that there is no categorical exclu-
sion from FLSA coverage for "religious or nonprofit organiza-
tions."144 When non-profit organizations are engaged in activities that
"serve the general public in competition with ordinary commercial en-
terprises," they may be subject to the FLSA.145 Second, the Court
held that despite the self-identification of the associates as "volun-
teers," they were in fact employees working in expectation of in-kind
compensation, and their willingness to work without wages enabled
the Foundation to gain an advantage over its competitors.146
Significantly, while the Alamo case was decided before Congress
added the "volunteer" exemption to the FLSA, the Court addressed
the issue of distinguishing between the employees used by the Foun-
dation and true "volunteers." There is no reason to fear that covering
the Foundation's business operations under the FLSA, held the Court,
will "lead to coverage of volunteers who drive the elderly to church,
serve church suppers, or help remodel a church home for the needy."
The Court distinguished the associates in the Alamo case from situa-
tions of "[o]rdinary volunteerism," which is "not threatened by this
interpretation of the statute."147
A similar outcome was reached in Archie v. Grand Central Part-
141 471 U.S. 290 (1985).
142 Id. at 292.
143 Id. at 293.
144 Id. at 298-97.
145 Id. at 299.
146 Id. at 300-301.
147 Id. at 302-303.
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nership, Inc.,148 written by then-District Judge Sonya Sotomayor,
which addressed the Department of Labor's enforcement action
against a public agency partnership that placed homeless people in
positions where they could gain work experience, at sub-minimum
wages (averaging $1 to $1.50 per hour).149 The purpose of the "Path-
way to Employment" program, which was run by a non-profit corpo-
ration, was to aid the homeless in "developing vocational skills for the
purpose of future employment."150
The court held that notwithstanding the praiseworthy purpose of
the program, and the fact that the homeless clients "benefitted enor-
mously from the work opportunities provided," the program violated
the FLSA. By paying wages to the participants that were far below
the minimum wage, the non-profit corporation gained an unfair ad-
vantage in bidding for contracts to provide services (such as recycling
and security) in competition with commercial businesses. At the same
time, the program was structured like a regular work environment,
and not a training program.15' Unlike in Alamo, the non-profit in the
Archie case did not argue that the homeless were working as "volun-
teers," but the broader point is the same: neither the Department of
Labor nor the courts will give a "pass" to programs run by non-profits,
even for very worthy goals.
Concerns will be raised, even in externships in the non-profit sec-
tor, if several factors are present: the activity in which the host is en-
gaged competes with commercial enterprises; the relationship created
between the host and the extern looks like a regular employment rela-
tionship; and the program is not designed to fall within one of the
special categories exempted from FLSA requirements (such as volun-
teers or trainees). In a law school externship program, for example, a
student extern doing legal work at a non-profit law firm or legal de-
fense fund on a fee-shifting case might well look, to the Labor Depart-
ment, much like an extern at a for-profit law firm doing legal work on
a fee-generating case. While this issue is unlikely to arise when a law
student is externing with a prosecutor's office, student externs at legal
services clinics and public interest groups may well be working on the
types of matters which are also handled, for fees, by private lawyers.
If so, the Department may well apply the same analysis outlined in
above, rather than treating the externs as "volunteers."
There is no question that the Department of Labor, given its
statements on the issue, sees unpaid externships at public agencies and
148 997 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
149 Id. at 513.
150 Id. at 509.
151 Id. at 533.
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non-profit organizations as an easier case for purposes of exclusions
from the FLSA, at least in the abstract, than unpaid externships in for-
profit businesses. At the same time, there are important reasons to
carefully structure all law school externship programs, wherever the
law students may be placed. To begin with, for any externships offered
for academic credit by a law school, the school must ensure compli-
ance with the ABA Standards, which will require designing and ad-
ministering the externship as a valuable and considered educational
training program. This will already implicate many of the same con-
cerns shared by the Department of Labor in Fact Sheet #71 under the
FLSA.
As important, the principles in this area are far from clear. The
Department has never, for example, embodied in any regulation or
clear statement of policy its approach to externships at non-profit or-
ganizations, as opposed to state and local public agencies. Nor is it
clear when an extern's activities as a permissible "volunteer" will cross
the line and implicate the kind of concerns that led to the FLSA en-
forcement actions in Alamo Foundation and Grand Central Partner-
ship. While it is possible that the Department may provide further
guidance in this area, there is no information available as to when that
might occur.
All of these factors suggest that the best course is simply to de-
sign all law school externships with the goal in mind - shared by the
ABA and the Department of Labor - to make it a valuable training
opportunity for the law student, rather than a chance for employers to
obtain free student labor.
V. SOME "BEST PRACTICES" IN DESIGNING LAW
SCHOOL EXTERNSHIPS
This Article has concluded, based on a close analysis of the gov-
erning statute, cases and agency interpretations, that unpaid law
school externships at off-campus work sites will be viewed by the De-
partment of Labor as permissible to the extent such placements meet
the general six-part test developed by the Department to describe the
parameters of "trainee" programs that are an exception to the wage
and overtime requirements of the FLSA. As laid out at length above,
under the Department's six-part test, it is important to design a law
school externship so that it is clearly an educational training program,
rather than merely providing work experience. This suggests that
there are some "best practices" that are advisable in designing FLSA-
compliant programs. Although not an exhaustive list, these best prac-
tices might include some of the following features.
Educating Host Organizations: It is important to ensure that the
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host organizations understand and agree, from the outset, that the
function and purpose of the externship program is to provide externs
with an educational benefit, and that the externship program is not,
for example, a job placement program to supply law students who can
serve as temporary workers to meet the organization's needs. In its
letter to the ABA, the Department expresses the benefit from the le-
gal externship at issue in that letter as providing a law student with
"professional practice in the furtherance of his or her education." 152
The emphasis in these discussions between the law school and the ex-
tern hosts needs to be on the experience for the extern and on the
educational benefits the extern will derive from the placement. Host
organizations that express concern or hesitation about this focus, or
have a more business-driven conception of the extern's role and as-
signments, should not be included in the externship program. Instead,
they should be re-directed to the law school's Career Services staff
with the recommendation that they consider hiring some of the law
school's students as term-time law clerks, which would be more suited
to their needs.
Written Materials and Agreements: It is critical to have clear,
written materials, which may even be framed as agreements or memo-
randa of understanding, setting out the expectations of each of the
participating parties, including the law school, the host organization,
and the student. Both in discussions and in written materials, it is im-
portant that externs not be referred to as "employees" or "workers."
While carefully drafted language in the accompanying documents will
not save a program that is administered poorly, using the right terms
will reinforce the true nature of the relationship to all involved and
help to document these discussions for any later review.15 3
The written materials should include documentation to ensure
compliance with Factors Five and Six of the Department's test. Specif-
ically, the intern and host organization should expressly agree in writ-
ing before the externship commences that: (a) the extern is not
entitled to a job at the conclusion of the externship; and (b) the extern
will not be entitled to wages for the time spent in the externship. 154
Again, the function of this writing is not only to document FLSA com-
pliance to reinforce to all involved that the externship is a training
program, and not a job. Some additional factors that should be ad-
152 DOL Letter to ABA, supra note 83, at 2.
153 See, e.g., Archie v. Grand Central Partnership, Inc., 997 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)
(in a case rejecting application of the "trainee" exception to FLSA, the court noted that
contemporaneous documents used the term "workers" to describe the persons at issue, and
that the only documents that described in other terms post-dated the company's knowl-
edge of threatened litigation).
154 See Fact Sheet#71, supra note 8, at 1.
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dressed in the written materials are discussed further below.
Law School Oversight: It is important to ensure that the law
school exercises continuing oversight of the externship experience and
placements. Because the field placement is not a job, but a carefully
designed educational program to provide students with direct expo-
sure to the work lawyers actually do, the law school and host organiza-
tion should work closely in shaping the experience for each intern, to
ensure that both law school goals and FLSA standards are met. Each
law school should, of course, structure its legal externships from the
outset so that they are FLSA-compliant, but more than this, a law
school also needs to administer its externship programs to ensure that
the parameters are actually met in practice. An externship program
that is in compliance with the FLSA's training exception only on pa-
per is not likely to be given a pass if examined by the Labor Depart-
ment or the courts.
Academic Credit: It is helpful, though not essential, that the ex-
ternship be taken for law school credit. Fact Sheet #71 uses academic
credit as one of the facts that suggests the externship is an extension of
the educational experience, rather than a job. Thus, if an externship is
given for academic credit - and/or in conjunction with courses given
for academic credit - that fact is helpful in showing the educational
purpose of the hands-on experience, and in reinforcing that the ex-
ternship is an extension of and integral to the student's law school
education. 155 By giving credit for the externship, the law school both
recognizes the educational value of the externship and frees the stu-
dent to devote himself or herself to the externship intensively during
the law school term, while still earning credit toward graduation. Giv-
ing credit for the field placement also reinforces the law school's rec-
ognition that the experience is an integral part of the training required
to become a competent and ethical practicing lawyer.
Indeed, as noted above, the ABA has just adopted an amend-
ment to the ABA Standards for Approval of Law Schools that re-
quires law students to take six credits in experiential courses during
law school in order to graduate. These experiential credits include,
though they are not limited to, field placements through extern-
ships.156 This revised Standard reinforces that externships are indeed
an educational experience required as part of the student's legal
155 At the same time, an externship that is well-designed should be able to meet the
requirements for exclusion from FLSA even if it is not taken for academic credit. The
Department of Labor, in its exchange with the ABA, indicated that law students who in-
terned at private law firms working on pro bono matters only, under the conditions posed
by the ABA, would be excluded from FLSA coverage "whether or not any academic credit
is provided." DOL Letter to ABA, supra note 83, at 2.
156 ABA Standards, supra note 3, Standard 303(a)(3).
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training.
Similarity to Law School Clinic Experience: Externships that in-
volve field placements should, to the extent possible, mimic the expe-
rience that a student would have in a law school legal clinic to show
that the externship is indeed, to quote Factor One, "similar to training
which would be given in an educational environment." In analyzing
FLSA coverage of an externship program, the Department of Labor's
1988 letter expressly compared a legal externship to the experience a
student would receive in a "law school clinical programs."' 57
Law school clinics are governed by the ABA Standards, which
specify certain requirements for a law student's experience in a
school-run law clinic. In an in-school clinic, the law school must af-
ford opportunities for students to represent or advise "actual clients,"
must provide "direct supervision" of the student's performance by
faculty, and must allow opportunities for student "performance," for
faculty "feedback," and for student "self-evaluation," as well as in-
cluding an instructional component. 158
The more an externship program is designed to parallel a law
school clinic experience at the same school, the easier it will be to
show that the field placement is comparable to the training that the
student would receive at the law school itself. Looking to the ABA
Standards, some key components, in this regard, are (a) ensuring that
students receive direct supervision and meaningful feedback in con-
nection with the student's performance, as they would if they were
engaging in client representation within a law school clinic; and (b)
designing the program so that students are called upon to reflect upon
their practice experiences and to engage in self-evaluation of their le-
gal skills and areas for improvement.159 Satisfying these elements will
help establish compliance both with the ABA and with the FLSA ex-
clusion for training programs.
Assignments during the Externship: Monitoring and regulating
the types of assignments given to the law student as an extern is also
an essential component of ensuring FLSA compliance. To ensure that
problems with the FLSA will not arise, law student externs should be
given substantive legal work, and not assigned to menial labor or non-
legal tasks, so that the externship will, indeed, provide meaningful
training. In approving the ABA pro bono programs at private law
firms, the Department of Labor provided some guidance in this regard
157 DOL Letter to ABA, supra note 8, at 2.
158 Id.
159 See also ABA Standards, supra note 3, Standard 305(e)(7) (requiring that a field
placement program, such as an externship, provide for "opportunities for student reflec-
tion on their field placement experience").
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by describing both the types of assignments that will be treated as part
of the law student's legal education and those that will not qualify the
student extern for exclusion from the FLSA. Both comments are
helpful here.
The Department has described favorably a legal internship pro-
gram that engages law students in substantive legal work, as follows:
Where law firm internships involve law students participating in or
observing substantive legal work, such as drafting or reviewing doc-
uments or attending client meetings or hearings, the experience
should be consistent with the educational experience the intern
would receive in a law school clinical program. 160
On the other hand, the Department has emphasized that an extern
assigned to perform "routine non-substantive work that could be per-
formed by a paralegal" would instead be considered an employee sub-
ject to FLSA. The same guidance is echoed in Fact Sheet #71, which
emphasizes that in a proper training program, an intern will be as-
signed to perform "routine work of the business on a regular and re-
curring basis." 161
These sources suggest that it is important to make sure that the
legal extern is being assigned to do substantive work that is legal in
nature, and is not being assigned either to non-legal work or to menial
tasks of the type that would otherwise be performed by a paralegal or
a legal secretary. It is also important that the work be varied, to give
the extern skills in a number of areas.162
Duration of the Externship: On a related point, as a natural mat-
ter, law school externships will typically track the length of a law
school semester. This is another factor that could be important in
showing that the externship is part of a coordinated educational expe-
rience. Prior Labor Department guidance suggests that it is important
that the externship be of an appropriate, and limited, duration in time
- and that the specific duration of the externship be determined with
the educational goals of the field placement in mind.163 In the law
160 DOL Letter to ABA, supra note 83, at 2.
161 Fact Sheet #71, supra note 8, at 2.
162 Cf U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, WAGE AND HOUR DIVISION, OPINION LETTER
(Oct. 7, 1975) (noting that a high school externship program designed to allow students to
engage in activities in connection with career education should be permissible if "students
continue rotating in the career exploration cycle, without settling on one occupation or
working an excessive length of time at one establishment in one occupation," but that it
presents a "closer question" where a student "spends substantial time in one employer's
establishment in one job").
163 Indeed, it appears that at one time at least, the Department of Labor had a presump-
tive limit of thirteen weeks for the appropriate length of school-related internships. See id.
(noting, in the context of a student internship program, that "generally, we will consider an
employment relationship to exist where a student has been with an employer 13 weeks").
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school context, this suggests that law schools should be hesitant to al-
low students to do more than one semester in the same field place-
ment, unless it is clear that new skills will be taught and additional
training provided in the second semester.
Avoiding Displacement of Regular Workers: In each case, the law
school and the host organization should also be sensitive to the risk
that a law student extern will be used improperly to meet the host's
regular hiring needs or to perform work that would ordinarily be done
by paid employees. Such practices will likely take the program
outside of the narrow FLSA exception for training programs, and may
result in treatment of the law students as "employees" for legal
purposes.
The easiest cases in which to apply this principle are those in
which, for example, a law firm that ordinarily hires summer associates
and term-time law clerks decides instead to use unpaid law student
externs. This would be a clear case of the student extern displacing
regular paid employees, and the Department of Labor would likely
require payment for the extern's services under FLSA. The same
would be true if a law firm were able to reduce its regular staff by
adding an externship program. Similarly, a law firm that agrees to
take on externs because it has an unusually large client matter that is
beyond the capacity of its existing staff should raise red flags. In such
cases, the circumstances should suggest that the host may be taking on
the law student extern for the firm's own immediate financial benefit,
rather than for the purpose of assisting with the student's education
and mentorship.
Similarly, in discussions about participation in the externship pro-
gram, a law firm or company should not view participation in the ex-
ternship program as an opportunity to save costs by reducing the
budget attributable to support staff or contract lawyers. A sensitive
understanding on the part of the host organization as to what the ex-
ternship is program is - and is not - is essential, as is careful monitor-
ing or project assignments by both the law school and the host
supervisor. To reinforce this message, it may be advisable for the writ-
ten agreement to call upon a host organizations to acknowledge ex-
pressly that it understands that unpaid student externs cannot be used
as a stand-in for compensated workers, and that an externship pro-
gram will not be a budgetary cost-savings measure and will necessarily
result in some supervisory burdens to the organization. 164
This position is from a 1975 opinion letter, and it is not clear whether that guideline is still
in force. It does, however, fairly closely track the general length of externship taken over a
law school semester.
164 See Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc., 2013 WL 2495140 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (rely-
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On-Site Supervision of Externs: Another component of an educa-
tional program is, of course, supervision and instruction from an ex-
perienced mentor-here, a lawyer at the host organization. The
Department of Labor has expressly emphasized that supervision by
licensed attorneys "provides an educational benefit to the law
student." 165
Billable Hour Issues: Certain special issues related to billing need
to be dealt with up front in creating any externship program that con-
templates placement in private, for-profit law firms. Private law firms
commonly bill their clients based on the hours spent by lawyers and
other staff members on the client's matters. This presents two issues,
as discussed above. The first is that allowing a firm to bill a client for
time spent by an unpaid extern would be the type of "immediate ad-
vantage" to the firm that would take the externship outside of the
training exception recognized by the Department (and require the
firm to compensate the law student as it would a regular employee).
The second is that billing pressures within private law firms make it
particularly important to ensure that lawyers within the firm are pro-
viding adequate training and oversight to the law student externs.
Thus, when placing students in externships in private law firms, a
law school should be particularly careful to ensure that the law firm
understands the nature of the program and its responsibilities, and
should be selective in which private for-profit law firms it accepts for
participation in an externship program. The law firms should agree to
keep records documenting the time spent supervising externs. Obvi-
ously, there should also be a flat prohibition on charging clients for
the legal work performed by unpaid law student externs, as well as a
ban on billing clients for the time spent by lawyers in supervising the
student externs. 166
CONCLUSION
This Article has set out to accomplish a necessary, if technical,
next step in the evolution of law school experiential education: deter-
mining whether, and how, law school externships that provide critical
training for law students can be squared with important federal laws
designed to protect those students when they are instead working as
ing on evidence that if the interns "had not performed these tasks for free, a paid employee
would have been needed").
165 DOL Letter to ABA, supra note 83, at 2.
166 There are, undoubtedly, many other "best practices" that could be included in this
list. I do not mean to disregard the fine program brochures and guidance developed by
many law schools in connection with their externship programs, many of which incorporate
"best practices" in this area.
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employees in the same types of legal settings. In the course of doing
so, I have demonstrated that the interests of the law school and the
law student mesh with the concerns of the Labor Department in en-
forcing the FLSA. Both are concerned to make sure that unpaid legal
externships provide meaningful training and educational experiences
for law students and are not misused by legal employers to take ad-
vantage of unpaid student labor. In so doing, this Article not only
clarifies the right way to think about law school externships but also
responds to a common, if unjustified, critique of law school externship
programs: if students are working, why aren't they getting paid - and
why are they paying the law school for the work experience?1 67 The
answer is, of course, that they are not working. Instead, law student
externs are receiving valuable, supervised training in the field that is
overseen and administered by the law school.
There is a serious issue with the cost of law school tuition, but
focusing this critique on externships is misplaced. Properly under-
stood, externships are not simply job placements obtained through an
office at the law school, but valuable training programs that require
extensive oversight and management by the law school and are ac-
companied by a carefully designed academic component. If a similar
approach were taken to breaking down the "worth" of different cur-
ricular offerings at law schools, one might as aptly critique large lec-
ture courses on the ground that students aren't getting their "money's
worth." In fact, however, all of the varied components of a law
school's program - including doctrinal classes and experiential field
placements - are important in giving students a complete, varied, and
effective education in the law. The good news, in this regard, is that
the research laid out in this Article suggests that the law school ex-
ternships can be a legally permissible part of this process under the
FLSA, even in for-profit settings such as corporations and law firms,
and that FLSA obstacles can be overcome when law school externship
programs are designed carefully and administered diligently.
167 See, e.g., Mark Chandler, Letting 3Ls Earn Both School Credit and Pay for Extern-
ships Could Make a Dent in Debt Crisis, ABA J., Oct.16, 2013 (proposing to revise ABA
Standards so that law students do not pay have to pay tuition during field placements, and
tuition can be paid instead by host companies), available at http://www.abajournal.com/
legalrebels/article/mark-chandler_3L-externshipjawstudentsdebt/.
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